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BECK, ROBERT EDWARD. The Supreme Court and the 
Constitutional Rights of Students: The Burger Years: 
1969 - 1986. (1987) Directed by: Dr. Joseph E. 
Bryson. Pp. 167. 
This study has as its purpose a review and analy­
sis of United States Supreme Court decisions rendered 
by the Burger Court which address the constitutional 
rights of American school students. Five major issues 
are addressed: (1) right to due process, (2) right to 
free speech, (3) right to religious freedom, (4) right 
to be protected from illegal searches and seizures, and 
(5) the right to receive information and ideas. 
Based on an analysis of the cases which came be­
fore the Burger Court for interpretation, the following 
general conclusions can be made concerning the consti­
tutional rights of students: 
(1) Generally, the Court favored the authority of 
school administrators to maintain control over the pub­
lic schools in the United States. 
(2) The Court often expresses reluctance to become 
entangled in the daily school operation in which school 
boards, and school administrators are vested with au­
thority. 
(3) The Court will become involved if a student is 
denied his constitutional right to due process. 
(4) In the area of students' rights, the Tinker case 
remains the staunch precedent on which many major edu­
cational issues are resolved. 
(5) The Burger Court is committed to the concept of 
"separation of church and state." 
(6) In New Jersey v. T.L.O.. the Burger Court main­
tains that a less exacting "reasonable suspicion" 
standard is more applicable in the school setting con­
cerning the issue of search and seizure. 
(7) In the 1982 Pico case, the Court noted that the 
First Amendment limits a board's discretion to remove 
books from school libraries. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 27, 1986, Chief Justice Warren Burger sub­
mitted his resignation to President Ronald Reagan, who 
subsequently nominated Associate Justice William H. 
Rehnquist to become the nation's sixteenth chief jus­
tice. On September 17, 1986, the United States Senate 
confirmed Rehnquist's nomination by a vote of 65 - 33, 
bringing to a close a tumultuous period in the Court's 
history.1 Chief Justice Burger served seventeen 
years as chief justice, longer than any other chief 
justice in the twentieth century. 
If, as historical wisdom suggests, presidents fre­
quently nominate Supreme Court justices who are fabri­
cated from their own political ideology, clearly presi­
dential nominees can signal a new direction in the 
Supreme Court.2 President Richard Nixon inherited a 
^School Law News, "Rehnquist and Scalia Confirmed 
by Senate, t!~Vol. 14, No. 20 (Oct. 2, 1986), p. 6. 
2 Joseph Bryson, "Current Trends in Education 
Law", Sports and the Courts: Physical Education and 
Sports Law Quarterly, June 6-10, 1983, p. 47. 
2 
"liberal Court" - the liberal Warren Court.3 He prom­
ised the American public to nominate Supreme Court jus­
tices adhering to his own conservative political ide­
ology. 4 President Nixon's conservative ideology is 
encapsulated in the following: 
...one whose work on the Court would 
'strengthen the peace forces as against the 
criminal forces of the land' ; one who would 
have an appreciation of the basic tenets of 
'law and order,' being 'thoroughly experienc­
ed and versed in the criminal laws of the 
country'; one who would see himself as a 
'caretaker' of the Constitution and not as a 
'super-legislator with a free hand to im­
pose... social and political view-points upon 
the American people;' one who was a 'strict 
constructionist* of the basic document; and 
one who had had broad experience as an ap­
peals judge on a lower judicial level.5 
On June 23, 1969, Chief Justice Earl Warren retir­
ed and was replaced by Warren E. Burger. Following an 
accusation by President Nixon of nonprofessional con­
duct for a Supreme Court justice, Associate Justice 
Abe Fortas also retired and was replaced by Associate 
Justice Harry Blackmun on June 9, 1970. The retirement 
3 
H.C. Hudgins, Jr., The Warren Court and the Pub­
lic Schools. (The Interstate Printers and Publishers, 
Inc., Danville, Illinois) 1970. 
4 
Bryson, supra note #2. 
5 
Henry J. Abraham, Justices and Presidents. (The 
Oxford Press, New York) 1974, p. 4. 
3 
of Associate Justices Hugo L. Black and John M. Harlan 
in 1971 provided President Nixon with an opportunity to 
appoint Lewis S. Powell and William Rehnquist to the 
Court. Although appointed by President Nixon for their 
conservative values, Justices Powell and Blackmun are 
considered to act as "centrists," or swing voters, who 
shift from liberal to conservative positions on the 
varying issues before the Court.® 
Justices Burger, Rehnquist, Powell, and Blackmun 
were appointed by President Nixon in an attempt to 
counteract the liberal excesses of the Warren Court.7 
President Nixon visualized a judicial revolution char­
acterized by a redefinition of the Warren Court deci­
sions. This revolution failed to materialize when the 
dominant "centrist" justices upheld the Warren Court's 
decisions concerning court-ordered busing, affirma­
tive-action plans, and criminal law reforms.8 
The story of the Burger Court...what­
ever else it might be, is not a tale of a 
conservative counter-revolution, at least not 
one of epic proportions or obvious import. 
If there have been historically significant 
g 
Abraham, supra note #5, p. 4. 
7 
Vincent Blasi, The Burger Court; The Counter 
Revolution That Wasn't. (Yale University Press, New 
Haven and London) 1983, p. vii. 
8Ibid. 
4 
shifts of premises or institutional dynamics, 
the movement has been subtle, complicated, 
not easily perceptible.9 
President Reagan continued the realignment of the 
Burger Court with the nomination and subsequent confir­
mation of Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor who 
replaced Justice Potter Stewart. The recent retirement 
of Chief Justice Warren Burger and the subsequent nom­
ination of Associate Justice William Rehnquist to be­
come chief justice is indicative of President Reagan's 
intent to fill the Court with justices of his own poli­
tical conservative philosophy. Justice Rehnquist"s 
record on the federal bench easily qualifies him as the 
most conservative member of the present United States 
Supreme Court.1° The Burger Court emerged from this 
background of presidential politics. 
The Purpose of the Study 
The primary purpose of this study is to examine 
and to analyze judicial decisions rendered by the 
Burger Court which address the constitutional rights of 
American school students. An additional purpose of 
this study is the development of practical legal guide-
9Ibid. 
10Facts on File: World News Digest with Index, 
"Burger Resigns as Chief Justice, Rehnquist Elevated," 
Vol. 46, No. 2378 (June 20, 1986), p. 445. 
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lines for educational decision makers. These guide­
lines will enable school administrators to better ad­
dress such issues as the appropriate organization and 
governance of the educational process within public 
schools without infringing upon the basic constitution­
al rights of students. 
Methodology 
This study utilizes the United States Supreme 
Court Reports as the primary source of Court decisions 
for the period under study. Secondary sources include 
books, journal articles, and dissertations. The cases 
are grouped under the following major headings: (l) 
the right to due process (Amendment XIV), (2) the right 
to free speech (Amendment I), (3) the right to religi­
ous freedom (Amendment I), (4) the right to be protect­
ed from illegal searches and seizures (Amendment IV) , 
and (5) the right to receive information and ideas 
(Amendment I) . 
Questions to be Answered 
Listed below are four key questions which this 
study will answer: 
1. What major educational issues concerning 
the violation of constitutional rights to 
public school students have been adjudi­
cated during the Burger years, 1969-1986? 
6 
2. Which of these issues are likely to re­
sult in further litigation in the courts? 
3. What are the acceptable criteria for 
maintaining order in the public schools, 
based on established legal precedents? 
4. Can any specific trends be determined 
from the analysis of the cases rendered 
by the Burger Court from 1969-1986? 
Coverage and Organization 
of Issues Involved 
This study is divided into four components. Chap­
ter Two reviews the literature which relates to the 
history of decisions made by the United States Supreme 
Court concerning student rights and the effect of stu­
dent rights on the administration of public schools. 
Chapter Three includes an analysis of the major 
legal issues relating to the constitutional rights of 
public school students between 1969 and 1986, termed 
the "Burger years". These rights of students are pro­
vided for primarily in the First, Fourth, and Four­
teenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. 
The Amendments are implemented into the following indi­
vidual freedoms: (1) the right to due process (Amend­
ment XIV), (2) the right to free speech (Amendment I), 
(3) the right to religious freedom (Amendment I) , (4) 
7 
the right to be protected from illegal searches and 
seizures (Amendment IV), and (5) the right to receive 
information and ideas (Amendment I). 
Chapter Four contains a general listing and dis­
cussion of major cases relating to the constitutional 
rights of students. The first category of cases in­
cludes those United States Supreme Court landmark deci­
sions relating to the right to due process. Other ca­
tegories of cases selected for review include cases 
related to: the right to free speech, the right to re­
ligious freedom, the right to be protected from illegal 
searches and seizures, and the right to receive infor­
mation and ideas. Facts of the cases, decisions of the 
courts, and discussions of the cases are presented for 
each category. 
The final chapter of the study contains a review 
and summary of the information obtained from the review 
of related literature and from the analysis of selected 
court cases. The questions posed in the introductory 
part of the study are reviewed and answered in the fi­
nal chapter. In conclusion, recommendations for formu­
lation of legally acceptable policies concerning the 
constitutional rights of students are made. 
8 
Scope and Limitations 
This study is limited to decisions rendered by the 
United States Supreme Court from October, 1969 to May, 
1986. The Court decisions studied are limited to those 
which have had a significant impact upon the constitu­
tional rights of students focusing on: (1) the right to 
due process, (2) the right to free speech, (3) the 
right to religious freedom, (4) the right to be pro­
tected from illegal searches and seizures, and (5) the 
right to receive information and ideas. 
Definition of Terms 
Action. To bring legal action against another for 
the protection of a right or the redress of a wrong.H 
Amicus curiae. (Latin for "friend of the court") 
not a party to the party directly involved.12 
Appellant. The party who takes an appeal from one 
court to another.13 
Appellee. The party against whom an appeal is 
^Black's Law Dictionary, (West Publishing Com­
pany, St. Paul, Minnesota) 1979. 
12Ibid. 
13Ibid. 
9 
taken.14 
Concurring opinion. An opinion written "by a judge 
who agrees with the majority of the court concerning 
the decision in a case, but has different reasons for 
arriving at that decision.15 
Conservatism. A set of political, economic, reli­
gious, educational, and other social beliefs character­
ized by emphasis on the status quo and social stabili­
ty, religion and morality, liberty and freedom, the 
natural Inequality of men, the uncertainty of progress, 
and the weakness of human reason.16 
Court. Where the word Court is capitalized, it 
denotes the United States Supreme Court.17 
Defendant. The party against whom relief or re­
covery is sought in a court action. 18 
Dissenting opinion. The opinion in which a judge 
announces his dissent from the conclusions held by the 
15Ibid. 
Fred N. Kerlinger, Liberalism and Conservatism: 
The Nature and Structure of Social Attitudes. (Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, New Jersey) 1984, pp. 
15-17. 
17 Black's Law Dictionary, supra note #11. 
18Ibid. 
10 
majority of the court.19 
Due process. The exercise of the powers of gov­
ernment in such a way as to protect individual 
rights.20 
En banc. ("as a whole") All federal judges in one 
circuit sitting as a court.21 
Enjoin. To order a defendant in equity to do or 
not to do a particular thing by writ of injunction.22 
Expulsion. At the prerogative of the superinten­
dent or school board, the exclusion of a student from 
school on a permanent basis.23 
Injunction. A judicial order requiring a party to 
take or refrain from some specified action.24 
In loco parentis. (Latin: in place of the par­
ent) Being charged with some of the rights, duties and 
responsibilities of the parent.25 
19Ibid. 
20Ibid. 
21Ibid. 
22Ibid. 
23Ibid. 
24Ibid. 
25Ibid. 
In re. (Latin: concerning)26 
Liberalism. A set of political, economic, religi­
ous, educational, and other social beliefs that empha­
size freedom of the individual, constitutional parti­
cipatory government and democracy, the rule of law, 
free negotiation, discussion and tolerance of different 
views, constructive social progress and change, egali-
tarianism and the rights of minorities, secular ration­
ality and rational approaches to social problems, and 
positive government action to remedy social deficien­
cies and to improve human welfare.27 
Litigation. The act or process of carrying on a 
lawsuit.28 
Penumbra. Marginal or unclear.29 
Plaintiff. A person who, in a personal action, 
seeks a remedy for an injury to his rights.30 
Precedent. A judicial decision, or a form of pro­
ceeding, or course of action, that serves as a rule for 
26Ibid. 
27 
Kerlinger, supra note #16 
28 
Black's Law Dictionary, supra note #11. 
29Ibid. 
30Ibid. 
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future determinations in similar or analogous cases; an 
authority to be followed in courts of justice.31 
Quasi. As, as of, as it were, relating to or hav­
ing the character of.32 
Remand. To send a case back to the same court out 
of which it came, for the purpose of having some action 
on it there.33 
Rights. Commonly used in a quasi-legal or moral 
sense to identify "something to which one has a just 
claim."34 
School disruption. Any event which significantly 
interrupts the education of students.35 
Suspension. At the prerogative of the principal, 
the exclusion of a student from school, usually for a 
short period, until the student conforms to the rules 
or regulations.36 
Writ of certiorari. (Latin: "to be informed of 
something") An order from a higher court to a lower 
31Ibid. 
32Ibid. 
33Ibid. 
34Ibid. 
35Ibid. 
36Ibid. 
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court requesting that the entire record of a case be 
sent up for review by the higher court.37 
37Ibid. 
14 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Overview 
Throughout the history of the United States, the 
Supreme Court has shaped and reflected the moral atti­
tudes and beliefs of the American people. As America 
has undergone distinct changes in philosophies and mor­
al standards, the Supreme Court has echoed these chang­
es in rendering legal decisions. This chapter focuses 
on the Supreme Court decisions which are related to 
student rights. The purpose of this chapter is to give 
the uninformed reader a background of the judicial cli­
mate which the Burger Court faced from 1969 - 1986. 
Many of the decisions rendered between 1788 and 
1969 were instrumental in shaping the modern American 
educational system. The review of judicial decisions 
will begin with the ratification of the United States 
Constitution on June 21, 1788 and will culminate with 
the appointment of Warren E. Burger as Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court in 1969. 
The first ten amendments to the Constitution, or 
the Bill of Rights, are the chief source of American 
constitutional rights. The first ten amendments to 
the Constitution were all enacted by December 15, 1791, 
during Washington's Administration and were intended to 
ensure freedoms and rights to American citizens.1 The 
constitutional amendments which focus on students' 
rights are: Amendment I, Amendment IV, and Amendment 
XIV. 
The First Amendment, adopted in 1791, states that 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise there­
of....1^ The wording of the First Amendment leaves 
the individual states free to enact laws which violate 
the intent of the amendment.3 According to the late 
E. C. Bolmeier, Professor of School Law at Duke Univer­
sity: 
The First Amendment restrained only the 
federal government in dealing with human 
rights. This left the states almost com­
pletely free to infringe the most basic human 
rights in any way their governments might 
choose. Not until the Fourteenth Amendment 
was adopted in 1868 did it become possible 
for the federal courts and Congress to re­
strict state action governing human life.4 
Mary Ann Harrell and Burnett Anderson, Equal 
Justice Under the Law. (The National Geographic Society 
Press, Washington, D.C.), 1986, pp. 1-14. 
2 United States Constitution. Amendment I. 
3 
E.C. Bolmeier, Landmark Supreme Court Decisions 
on Public School Issues, (The Michie Company, Char­
lottesville, Virginia) 1973, pp. 6-7. 
4Ibid. 
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The Fourteenth Amendment corrects this oversight 
and extends the prohibition of enacting laws which de­
prive a person of right to life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law, - liberties which are as­
sured by the First Amendment.5 
Articles One and Four of the Constitution also 
contain important provisions ensuring certain basic 
rights. The Constitution assures citizens protection 
from governmental tyranny and despotism. The Constitu­
tion does not, however, translate these promises of 
basic rights into practice. The framers of the Consti­
tution left the interpretation of the laws to the 
United States Supreme Court which is the final authori­
ty. 6 James Madison argues in the Federalist Paper No. 
78 that: 
The courts were designed to be an in­
termediate body between the people and the 
legislature..., to keep the latter within the 
limits assigned to their authority. The in­
terpretation of the law is the proper and 
peculiar province of the courts. A constitu­
tion is, in fact, and must be regarded by the 
judges, as a fundamental law. It, therefore, 
belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as 
5Ibid. 
6 
Frank R. Kemerer and Kenneth L. Deutsch, Consti­
tutional Rights and Student Life, (West Publishing com­
pany, St. Paul, Minn.), 1979, pp. 25-29. 
well as the meaning of any particular act 
proceeding from the legislative body.7 
Judicial Issues in Education: 
1803 - 1969. 
Marbury v. Madison.8 a case heard by the Court in 
1803, solidified the Court's authority to judicial 
review. Chief Justice John Marshall who wrote for the 
Court stated that "the Constitution is the supreme law 
of the land—'the paramount law'—and judges take an 
oath to support and defend the Constitution."9 Arti­
cle III of the Constitution requires the judiciary to 
interpret the law. Justice Marshall went on to write 
that it is the responsibility of a judge to declare 
null and void a law which he finds in conflict with the 
Constitution.10 
In 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution was adopted. The statute reads: 
All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdic­
tion thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the state wherein they reside. 
7 
The Federalist, (Modern Library, New York) 1937, 
p. 506. 
O 
Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 
(1803) . 
g 
Kemerer, supra note #6. 
10Ibid. 
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No state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.11 
The United States Congress enacted the Civil 
Rights Law of 1871 in an attempt "to enforce the provi­
sions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
and for other purposes."12 Section 1 of this Act, now 
codified as 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, speaks directly to 
the violations of constitutional rights.13 
The Civil Rights Act of 1875 was enacted by the 
United States Congress in an effort to prevent discrim­
ination in public places. The Civil Rights Act of 1875 
prohibited racial discrimination in inns, public con­
veyances, and places of amusement. Federal courts were 
given exclusive jurisdiction over cases deriving from 
this statute. Black citizens soon began to sue in fed­
eral courts for violations of their civil rights. 
Cases appeared before the Supreme Court protesting the 
11 
United States Constitution. Amendment XIV. 
12 
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong. 1st Sess., p. 522. 
13 
E. Wayne Trogden, The Civil Rights Law of 1871 
and Its Effect on Teacher Dismissal. (Unpublished Ed.D. 
dissertation, University of North Carolina 
Greensboro, N.C. 1980) 
19 
exclusion of Blacks from a hotel dining room in Topeka, 
Kansas, an opera house in New York, the dress circle of 
a San Francisco theater, and the ladies* car on a 
train. In 1883, the Court ruled 8-1 that the act was 
unconstitutional, stating that the Fourteenth Amendment 
gave Congress power over state action.14 
In 1896, the Fourteenth Amendment faced a sig­
nificant challenge. In the case of Plessv v. 
Ferguson,15 the Fourteenth Amendment was used for the 
first time in a desegregation case. This case centered 
around a Louisiana state law enacted in 1890. This law 
required two or more passenger cars on each train so 
that equal but separate accommodations could be provid­
ed for the black and white races. Plessy, a Black of 
one-eighth Negro ancestry, refused to leave a pas­
senger car designated for whites only. When he was 
arrested, he challenged the Louisiana law claiming it 
was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.16 
The Supreme Court upheld the Louisiana law in an 
8-1 decision. The opinion of the Court reads in part: 
14Civil Rights Cases. 109 U.S. 3 (1883) 
15 
Plessv v. Ferguson. 163 U.S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 
1138, 41 L. Ed. 256 (1896). 
1€Bolmeier, supra note #3, pp. 89-90. 
20 
We consider the underlying fallacy of 
the plaintiff's argument to consist in the 
assumption that the enforced separation of 
the two races stamps the colored race with 
the badge of inferiority. If this be so, it 
is not by reason of anything found in the 
act, but solely because the colored race 
chooses to put that construction upon 
it...The argument also assumes that social 
prejudices may be overcome by legislation, 
and that equal rights cannot be secured to 
the negro except by an enforced commingling 
of the two races. We cannot accept this pro­
position. . .Legislation is powerless to eradi­
cate racial instincts...If one race be infer­
ior to the other socially, the Constitution 
of the United States cannot put them upon the 
same plane.17 
The decision was not unanimous. Associate Justice 
Harlan wrote the Court's dissenting opinion: 
...in the view of the Constitution, in 
the eye of the law, there is no caste here. 
Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither 
knows nor tolerates classes among citi­
zens. ..We boast of the freedom enjoyed by our 
people above all other peoples. But it is 
difficult to reconcile that boast with a 
state of the law which, practically, puts the 
brand of servitude and degradation upon a 
large class of our fellow-citizens, our 
equals before the law. The thin disguise of 
'equal' accommodations for passengers in 
railroad coaches will not mislead any one, 
nor atone for the wrong this day done.18 
In upholding the Louisiana state law, the Supreme 
Court established the doctrine of "separate but equal" 
for American public schools; a doctrine held until the 
17 
Plessy v. Ferguson, supra note #15. 
18Ibid. 
1954 decision of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 
Kansas.19 
The Plessv v. Ferguson20 decision created an en­
vironment for many states that had no legislative man­
date to legislate separate but equal educational sys­
tems for black children. Moreover, states with legisla­
tive enactments separating children on the basis of 
race were more secure in pupil assignments. Five de­
cades passed before a significant challenge to the de­
cision was brought before the Court. 
In 1923, the Fourteenth Amendment again faced a 
critical challenge. Following World War I, the state 
of Nebraska enacted a piece of legislation prohibiting 
any course taught in Nebraska schools from being taught 
in any language other than the English language. The 
same legislative act prohibited the teaching of a for­
eign language as a course in itself until a student had 
completed the eighth grade. The legislation was chal­
lenged before the United States Supreme Court in 1923 
in the case known as Meyer v. Nebraska. 21 Robert T. 
19 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas. 
347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954). 
20 . 
Plessv v. Ferguson, supra note #15. 
21Mever v. Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625 
(1923) . 
22 
Meyer, a teacher in a non-public school, was convicted 
in a Nebraska court of teaching reading in the German 
language to a ten-year-old student. The Nebraska 
Supreme Court upheld the state's right to prohibit 
teaching of a foreign language contending that it was 
an issue of public safety and general welfare.22 
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the deci­
sion of the Nebraska State Supreme Court was reversed 
in a 7-2 vote. The argument that such a regulation 
fell within the proper police powers of the state was 
rejected by the Court. Associate Justice McReynolds 
wrote the majority opinion with Chief Justice Taft and 
Associate Justices McKenna, Van Devanter, Brandeis, 
Butler, and Sanford concurring in the opinion. Jus­
tices Holmes and Sutherland dissented.23 
Associate Justice McReynolds wrote in part: 
Practically, education of the young is 
only possible in schools conducted by especi­
ally qualified persons who devote themselves 
thereto. The calling always has been regard­
ed as useful and honorable, essential, in­
deed, to the public welfare. Mere knowledge 
of the German language cannot reasonably be 
regarded as harmful. Theretofore it has been 
22 
E. Edmund Reutter, Jr., The Supreme Court's Im­
pact on Public Education. (Phi Delta Kappa and National 
Organization on Legal Problems in Education), 1982, pp. 
6-7. 
23Ibid. 
commonly looked upon as helpful and desir­
able. Plaintiff in error taught this lan­
guage in school as part of his occupation. 
His right thus to teach and the right of par­
ents to engage him so to instruct their 
children, we think, are within the liberty of 
the Amendment.24 
Two years after the Meyer decision, another ques­
tion of significant importance was brought before the 
Court. The 1925 Pierce v. the Society of Sisters 
(Oregon)25 case raised the question, "Can a state adopt 
a statute which requires a child to attend a public 
school?" The question before the Court was reduced to: 
"Has the state, through its legislative functions, the 
power, under the guise of police regulation, to de­
prive parochial and private school organizations of the 
liberty and right to carry on their schools for teach­
ing in the grammar grades?" This case, which emerged 
from a legislative act enacted by the Oregon General 
Assembly, maintained that: 
Any parent, guardian, or other person in 
the state of Oregon, having control or charge 
or custody of a child under the age of six­
teen years and of the age of eight years or 
over at the commencement of a term of public 
school of the district in which said child 
resides, who shall fail or neglect or refuse 
24 Meyer v. Nebraska, supra note #21. 
25 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters (Ore.), 268 U.S. 
510, 45 S. Ct. 571 (1925). 
24 
to send such child to a public school for the 
period of time a public school shall be held 
during the current year in said district, 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and each 
day's failure to send such child to a public 
school shall constitute a separate of­
fense. . . 26 
The Society of Sisters (The Society of the Holy 
Names of Jesus and Mary) and the Hill Military Academy 
brought suit in Federal District Court in March, 1924 
seeking to have the act declared null and void. The 
Society of Sisters claimed that the act denied them 
constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment 
because it deprived them of life, liberty, property, 
and equal protection of the law. When the District 
Court found in favor of the Society of Sisters, and 
the state appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 
In 1925, the Court rendered its decision upholding the 
decision of the lower court. The Court's concluding 
remarks were: 
Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262, U.S.390, we think it entirely plain that 
the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with 
the liberty of parents and guardians to di­
rect the upbringing and education of children 
under their control. As often heretofore 
pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Con­
stitution may not be abridged by legislation 
which has no reasonable relation to some pur­
pose within the competency of the State. The 
26 
Bolmeier, supra note #3, pp. 19-20. 
25 
fundamental theory of liberty upon which all 
governments in this Union repose excludes any 
general power of the State to standardize its 
children by forcing them to accept instruc­
tion. from public teachers only. The child is 
not the mere creature of the State; those who 
nurture him and direct his destiny have the 
right, coupled with the high duty, to recog­
nize and prepare him for additional obliga­
tions . 27 
The United States Supreme Court developed the 
"child benefit" theory in the 1930 case, Cochran v. 
Louisiana State Board of Education28. the first test of 
the constitutionality of using tax funds in support of 
education. The issue involved a 1928 Louisiana law 
which provided free school books to all Louisiana 
school children. A group of citizens brought suit 
claiming that the statute was a violation of specified 
provisions of the state Constitution and also the Four­
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
Specifically, they charged that taxation for purchas­
ing school books constituted a taking of public proper­
ty for private purposes.29 
Upon failure to convince the state courts to issue 
27 Pierce v. Society of Sisters (Ore.), supra note 
#25. 
28 
Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education. 
281 U.S. 370, 50 S. Ct. 335, 74 L. Ed. 1157 (1930). 
26 
an injunction against enforcement of the law, a citi­
zens group appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 
The Court, in a unanimous decision, ruled that schools 
were not beneficiaries of the provisions of the law. 
"The school children and the state alone are the bene­
ficiaries ."30 chief Justice Hughes wrote the majority 
opinion for the Court maintaining: 
The appropriations were made for the 
specific purpose of purchasing school books 
for the use of the school children of the 
state, free of cost to them. It was for 
their benefit and the resulting benefit to 
the state that the appropriations were 
made.31 
The Court has since ruled on three separate occa­
sions that the lending of textbooks by the state to 
non-public schools is constitutional.32 
In the 1940 case of Minersville School District v. 
Gobitis.33 the Court upheld, in an 8-1 decision, the 
constitutionality of a school district regulation which 
30Ibid. 
31Ibid. 
32 
H.C. Hudgins, Jr., and Richard S. Vacca, Law and 
Education; Contemporary Issues and Court Decisions, 
(The Michie Company, Charlottesville, Virginia) 1985, 
p. 368. 
33 
Minersville School District v. Gobitis (Pa.), 
310 U.S. 586, 60 S. Ct. 1010 (1940). 
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required all children tg participate in the daily flag-
ceremony. The issue centered around the First Amend­
ment's Free Exercise Clause. The Gobitis family be­
longed to the Jehovah's Witnesses religious sect whose 
religious doctrine teaches that such gestures of re­
spect for the flag violate the Biblical Scriptures. On 
May 3, 1937, the Gobitis family filed suit in United 
States Federal District Court requesting an injunction 
against the enforcement of the regulation. The suit 
was followed by several years of bitter arguments. On 
March 4, 1940, the United States Supreme Court issued a 
writ of certiorari.34 
Justice Frankfurter wrote the majority opinion 
for the Court stating in part: 
A grave responsibility confronts this 
Court whenever in course of litigation it 
must reconcile the conflicting claims of lib­
erty and authority. But when the liberty 
invoked is liberty of conscience, and the 
authority is authority to safeguard the na­
tion's fellowship, judicial conscience is put 
to its severest test. Of such a nature is 
the present controversy... 
The preciousness of the family rela­
tion, the authority and independence which 
give dignity to parenthood, indeed the enjoy­
ment of all freedom, presuppose the kind of 
ordered society which is summarized by our 
flag. A society which is dedicated to the 
preservation of these ultimate values of ci­
vilization may in self-protection utilize the 
34 Reutter, supra note #22, pp. 48-49. 
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educational process for inculcating those 
almost unconscious feelings which bind men 
together in a comprehending loyalty, whatever 
may be their lesser differences and difficul­
ties ... 35 
In the 1943 West Virginia State Board of Education 
v. Barnette36 case, the Court again heard arguments in­
volving the Jehovah's Witnesses. The issue was simi­
lar to the issue before the Court in the Gobitis case, 
a state regulation that school children had to salute 
the American flag. The State Board of Education had 
adopted a regulation that the salute to the flag be­
come 'a regular part of the program of activities in 
the public schools,' that all teachers and pupils 
"shall be required to participate in the salute honor­
ing the nation represented by the flag; provided, how­
ever, that refusal to salute the flag be regarded as an 
act of insubordination, and shall be dealt with accord­
ingly." On June 14, 1943, in a 6 - 3 decision, the 
United States Supreme Court upheld the lower court's 
ruling that the regulation was a violation of the First 
Amendment rights of the Jehovah's Witnesses, effective­
ly reversing the decision of the Court in the 
35 
Minersville School District v. Gobitis (Pa.), 
supra note #33. 
3 6 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette. 319 U.S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178, (1943). 
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Minersville case.37 Justice Jackson wrote the majority 
opinion stating: 
National unity as an end which officials 
may foster by persuasion and example is not 
in question. The problem is whether under 
our Constitution compulsion as here employed 
is a permissible means for its achieve­
ment ... Struggles to coerce uniformity of sen­
timent in support of comes end thought essen­
tial to their time and country have been wag­
ed by many good as well as evil men... 
If there is any fixed star in our con­
stellation, it is that no official, high or 
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox 
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion or force citizens to con­
fess by word or act their faith therein. If 
there are any circumstances which permit an 
exemption, they do not now occur to us. 
We think the action of the local author­
ities in compelling the flag salute and 
pledge transcends constitutional limitations 
on their power and invades the sphere of in­
tellect and spirit which it is the purpose of 
the First Amendment to our Constitution to 
reserve from all official control.38 
In the 1947 Everson v. Board of Education39 case, 
a New Jersey statute providing for the free transporta­
tion of school children to and from parochial schools 
was brought before the United States Supreme Court. In 
37Ibid. 
38Ibid. 
39 Everson v. Board of Education (N.J.), 330 U.S. 
1, 67 S. Ct. 504 (1947). 
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a 5-4 decision, the Court sustained the right of local 
school authorities to provide free transportation for 
pupils attending parochial schools in accordance with 
the New Jersey law.40 jn delivering the majority opin­
ion for the Court, Justice Black maintained: 
The First Amendment has erected a wall 
between church and state. That wall must be 
kept high and impregnable. We could not ap­
prove the slightest breach. New Jersey has 
not breached it here.41 
The question of release time for the purpose of 
religious instruction came before the Court in the 1948 
case, McCollum v. Board of Education.42 antj again in 
the 1952 case, Zorach v. Clauson.43 In 1948, the Court 
struck down as unconstitutional an Illinois statute 
which provided release time for public school students 
to receive religious instruction on a voluntary basis. 
Students who chose not to participate were required to 
go to another part of the building to continue their 
40Ibid. 
41Ibid. 
42 
McCollum v. Board of Education. 333 U.S. 203, 68 
S. Ct. 461 (1948). 
43 
Zorach v. Clauson. 343 U.S. 306, 72 S. Ct. 679 
(1952). 
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secular studies. The Court maintained that the prac­
tice was a violation of the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution on the basis that it was an 
impermissible advancement of religion.44 Four years 
later, the Court upheld a New York statute allowing 
public school students the opportunity to leave school 
early in order to receive religious instruction 
off-campus.45 
On May 17, 1954, the United States Supreme Court 
in a unanimous decision, rendered one of the most sig­
nificant decisions of the twentieth century—Brown v. 
Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas.46 jn essence, 
the Court ruled that separate-but-equal educational 
systems for blacks and whites are unconstitutional and 
that the existence of such laws is a violation of the 
equal protection of the law guaranteed by the Four­
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote the unanimous decision 
for the court. Justice Warren maintained: 
44 McCollum v. Board of Education, supra note #42. 
45 Zorach v. Clauson. supra note #43. 
46 Brown v. Board of Education, supra note #19. 
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...We come then to the question present­
ed: Does segregation of children in public 
schools solely on the basis of race, even 
though the physical facilities and other 
'tangible1 factors may be equal, deprive the 
children of the minority group of equal edu­
cation opportunities? We believe that it 
does. 
...Segregation of white and colored 
children in public schools has a detrimental 
effect upon the colored children. The impact 
is greater when it has the sanction of law, 
therefore, has a tendency to (retard) the 
educational and mental development of educa­
tional and mental development of negro (sic) 
children and to deprive them of some of the 
benefits they would receive in a racially 
integrated school system. Whatever may have 
been the extent of psychological knowledge at 
the time of Plessv v. Ferguson, this finding 
is amply supported by modern authority. Any 
language in Plessv v. Ferguson contrary to 
this finding is rejected. 
We conclude that in the field.of public 
education the doctrine of 'separate but 
equal* has no place. Separate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal. There­
fore, we hold the plaintiffs and others sim­
ilarly situated for whom the actions have 
been brought are, by reason of the segrega­
tion complained of, deprived of the equal 
protection of the laws guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.47 
In 1962, the New York State Board of Regents adopt­
ed for school use the following prayer, "Almighty God, 
we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy 
blessing upon us, our parents, our teachers, and our 
47Ibid. 
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Country." Upon adoption of the prayer as a regular 
part of the school day by the New Hyde Park school dis­
trict, the parents of ten students brought suit in 
state court contending that the required prayer was a 
violation of the First Amendment rights of their child­
ren. The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals of 
New York State where it was held not to be in violation 
of the First Amendment. The children's parents then 
appealed to the United States Supreme Court in the case 
known as Enqel v. Vitale48. the first religion case to 
be heard by the Warren Court. On June 25, 1962, the 
United States Supreme Court, in a 6-1 opinion (Justices 
Frankfurter and White did not participate.) held that 
to require a student to recite a state-composed prayer 
is a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment.49 
Associate Justice Black wrote the majority opinion 
stating in part: 
We think that by using its public school 
system to encourage recitation of the 
Regents' prayer, the State of New York has 
adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with 
48Enqel v. Vitale. (N.Y.), 370 U. S. 421, 82 S. 
Ct. 1261 (1962). 
49Ibid. 
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the Establishment Clause. There can, of 
course, be no doubt that New York's program 
of daily classroom invocation of God's bless­
ings as prescribed in the Regents' prayer is 
a religious activity. It is a solemn avowal 
of divine faith and supplication for the 
blessings of the Almighty. The nature of 
such a prayer has always been religious... 
. . . Neither the fact that the prayers 
may be denominationally neutral nor the fact 
that its observance on the part of students 
is voluntary can serve to free it from the 
limitations of the Establishment Clause, as 
it might from the Free Exercise Clause, of 
the First Amendment, both of which are opera­
tive against the States by virtue of the 
Fourteenth Amendment... The Establishment 
Clause... does not depend upon any showing of 
direct governmental compulsion and is violat­
ed by the enactment of laws which establish 
an official religion whether those laws oper­
ate directly to coerce non-observing indivi­
duals or not... But the purposes underlying 
the Establishment Clause go much further than 
that. Its first and most immediate purpose 
rested on the belief that a union of govern­
ment and religion tends to destroy government 
and to degrade religion.50 
In 1963, the Court considered a similar question 
from the state of Pennsylvania. The question in the 
case of Ablnqton School District v. SchemppfPa.)51 was, 
"Can a state require that Bible verses or the Lord's 
prayer be recited in the public schools even if provi­
sions are made to excuse from participating those stu­
50.. 
Ibid. 
51 
Abinqton School District v. Schempp (Pa.). 374 
U.S. 203, 83 S. Ct. 1560 (1963). 
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dents whose parents object?" The issue centered around 
a Pennsylvania law which required that at least ten 
Bible verses be read daily at the opening of the school 
day. The Schempp family belonged to the Unitarian 
faith. They sued claiming that the requirement was a 
violation of the First Amendment and, hence, a viola­
tion of the the Fourteenth Amendment.52 
When a United States Federal District Court ruled 
in favor of the Schempps, the State of Pennsylvania 
appealed to the United States Supreme Court. On June 
17, 1963, in an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court up­
held the decision of the lower court. Justice Clark 
wrote the majority opinion for the Court stating in 
part: 
In light of the history of the First 
Amendment and of our cases interpreting and 
applying its requirements, we hold that the 
practices at issue and the laws requiring 
them are unconstitutional under the Estab­
lishment clause, as applied to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The place of religion in our society is 
an exalted one, achieved through a long tra­
dition of reliance on the home, the church 
and inviolable citadel of the individual 
heart and mind. We have come to recognize 
through bitter experience that it is not 
within the power of government to invade that 
citadel, whether its purpose or effect be to 
52Ibid. 
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aid or oppose, to advance or retard. In the 
relationship between man and religion, the 
State is firmly committed to a position of 
neutrality. Though the application of that 
rule requires interpretation of a delicate 
sort, the rule is clearly and concisely stat­
ed in the words of the First Amendment.53 
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court rendered 
the decision known as In re Gault.54 jn essence, the 
Gault decision renders a juvenile the same constitu­
tional rights as an adult criminal. The decision re­
quires that a juvenile must be given: notice of the 
charges; right to counsel; right to confrontation and 
cross-examination of the witnesses; privilege against 
self-incrimination; right to a transcript of the pro­
ceeding; and right to appellate review. This decision 
was further defined in 1975 by the Burger Court in the 
case of Goss v. Lopez which will be discussed in detail 
in the next chapter.55 
In 1969, the United States Supreme Court rendered 
its most far-reaching decision in a century in the area 
of student rights. The Court affirmed the constitu­
53ibid 
54 
In re Gault. 387 U.S. 1, 40 00(2d) 378, 18 
L.Ed.(2d) 527, 827 S. Ct. 1428 (1967). 
55 
Goss v. Lopez. 95 S. Ct. 729 (Ohio 1975). 
37 
tional right of freedom of speech for students, in a 
7-2 decision in the case of Tinker v. Pes Moines 
Independent Community School District.56 
At the height of the Vietnam War, a group of stu­
dents in the Des Moines school district wore black arm 
bands to protest United States involvement in the war. 
The school administration had anticipated such an ac­
tivity and, in response, had adopted a policy to deal 
with the possibility of such an activity occurring. 
The policy called for the principal of the school to 
ask the students involved to remove the armbands. Re­
fusal to abide by the principal's directive would re­
sult in suspension from school. The school administra­
tion feared that wearing such armbands might cause a 
confrontation between the students and friends of a 
former student who had been killed in Vietnam. Stu­
dents at another high school in the same area had 
threatened to wear armbands of another color if the 
black armbands were allowed.57 
56 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District. 393 U.S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 
2d 731 (1969). 
57 
Robert T. Baker, E. C. Bolmeier, and Walter L. 
Hatzel, School in the Legal Structure. (The W.H. Ander­
son Company, Cincinnatti, Ohio), 1972, 269-272. 
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The remainder of the story is history. The stu­
dents wore armbands and were subsequently suspended. 
A suit was filed in the United States District Court by 
the students' parents where it was dismissed. Thus, 
the school administrators' action was upheld. On ap­
peal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit af­
firmed the decision, and the case was then appealed to 
the United States Supreme Court.58 
The Court concluded that the wearing of the arm­
bands was closely akin to "pure speech," which is guar­
anteed by the First Amendment. Justice Fortas said in 
his opinion for the Court: 
In our system, students may not be re­
garded as closed-circuit recipients of only 
that which the State chooses to communi­
cate...It can hardly be argued that either 
students or teachers shed their constitution­
al rights to freedom of speech or expression 
at the school house gate.59 
Fortas went on to say that school and state au­
thorities have the power to define and control pupil 
conduct as long as it is consistent with fundamental 
constitutional safeguards. "State-operated schools may 
68Ibid., p. 271. 
59 
Tinker v. Pes Moines, supra note #56. 
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riot be enclaves of governmental totalitarianism." 
School officials do not possess absolute authority over 
their students. Fortas wrote that schools must show 
"material and substantial disruption" before free ex­
pression can be prohibited.60 
The decision still stands, even though the Burger 
Court has chipped away at its original language in 
cases such as Goss v. Lopez.6! and New Jersey v. 
T.L.O. .62 and, most recently, in the case of Bethel 
School District v. Fraser.63 These cases will be dis­
cussed in detail in the next chapter. 
Summary 
An analysis of Supreme Court decisions and legis­
lative enactments from 1803 to 1969 reveal that the 
Court and the Congress are committed to the constitu­
tional rights of students. The interpretation of these 
rights is subject to change. For example, the Court 
60 
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reversed the 1896 Plessv v. Ferguson decision which 
established the "separate but equal" concept in the 
1954 Brown decision. In the 1943 West Virginia State 
Board of Education v. Barnette case, the Court reversed 
its 1940 Gobitis decision by ruling that a state may 
not require students to participate in daily flag cere­
monies . 
The Court has been consistent in maintaining a 
separation between secular and sectarian education as 
exemplified in the following cases: McCollum v. Board 
of Education. Zorach v. Clauson. Abington School 
District v. Schemmp. and Engel v. Vltale. Within this 
period of time, another case that should be noted is 
the 1969 Tinker case. In this case, the Court ruled 
that students do not "shed their constitutional rights 
at the school house gate." Many educational scholars 
believe that the Tinker case established the foundation 
for future litigation in the arena for students' 
rights. 
The evolution of the American system of public 
education is complex. It is shaped by and reflects 
the distinct religious and political characteristics of 
America. The United States Supreme Court has played 
a pivotal role in the development of the American sys­
41 
tem of public education since its inception. In the 
following chapter, the role that the Burger Court 
played in the continuing evolutionary process of public 
schools is reviewed and analyzed. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS OF STUDENTS: THE BURGER YEARS: 
1969 - 1986 
Controversy concerning the constitutional rights 
of students is complex in nature, enmeshed in prevail­
ing political and societal change. Decisions by the 
United States Supreme Court and lesser federal courts 
along with state courts influence the development of 
the constitutional rights of students. Many United 
States Supreme Court decisions relate directly or in­
directly to the constitutional rights of students. 
• Federal courts do not deal directly with educa­
tional concerns of public schools because the United 
States Constitution does not specifically mention edu­
cation.1 Futhermore, federal jurists in rendering 
decisions have lamented that courts do not wish to 
become involved in day-to-day operations or administra­
tive practices of public schools.2 Because public 
schools are governed by school boards, courts rarely 
1John C. Hogan, The Schools, the Courts, and the 
P u b l i c  I n t e r e s t  ( L e x i n g t o n  B o o k s ,  L e x i n g t o n ,  
Massachusetts) 1974, p. 6. 
2 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 89 S. Ct. 
266, 21 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1968). 
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substitute judicial judgment for that of representa­
tives chosen by the people. 
There are, however, two principal issues through 
which federal courts obtain jurisdictions in litigation 
involving public education: (1) alleged violation of 
constitutionally protected rights, privileges, or im­
munities of an individual; and (2) validity questions 
of state or federal statutes under the United States 
Constitution.3 
These two major issues have led to judicial in­
volvement in controversies concerning the constitution­
al rights of students. The constitutional rights of 
students fall into five major categories: (1) the right 
to due process; (2) the right to free speech; (3) the 
right to religious freedom; (4) the right to freedom 
from illegal searches and seizures; and (5) the right 
to receive information and ideas. This chapter will 
review Supreme Court decisions, rendered by the Burger 
Court from 1969 to 1986, which deal with the constitu­
tional rights of students in the above mentioned cate­
gories . 
3 
Hogan, supra note #1. 
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Right to Due Process 
(Amendment XIV) 
Four major United States Supreme Court decisions 
greatly expanded the constitutional rights of students. 
Two of those decisions were rendered by the liberal 
Warren Court, and two were rendered by the more conser­
vative Burger Court. The first important students' 
rights decision was rendered in 1967 by the Warren 
Court. The 1967 In re Gault4 decision granted to min­
ors the same due process rights as those of adults in 
criminal procedures. The 1969 Tinker5 decision de­
fined First Amendment rights for school children and 
has played an important role in every student rights 
case since it was rendered by the Court. In 1975, the 
Burger Court rendered two important student rights de­
cisions: Goss v. Lopez6 and Wood v. Strickland.7 
Both decisions were a result of a 5-4 vote by the jus­
4In re Gault. 387 U. S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. 
Ed. 2d 527 (1967). 
5 Tinker v. Pes Moines Independent School 
District. 393 U. S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 
731, (1969). 
6Goss V. Lopez. 95 S. Ct. 729, (Ohio, 1975). 
7Wood v. Strickland. 95 S. Ct. 992 (Ark. 1975). 
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tices.8 These two decisions "probably represented the 
apex of the emphasis on individual rights in educa­
tion. "9 
The GosslO decision gave students the right to 
receive minimal due process when suspended from school 
for short periods of time. Due process is guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court stated: 
Among other things, the State is con­
strained to recognize a student's legitimate 
entitlement to a public education as a pro­
perty interest which is protected by the Due 
Process Clause and which may not be taken 
away for misconduct without adherence to the 
minimum procedures required by that Clause.11 
Mr. Justice White wrote the majority opinion for 
the Court stating in part: 
We do not believe that school authori­
ties must be totally free from notice and 
hearing requirements if their schools are to 
operate with acceptable efficiency. Students 
facing temporary suspension have interests 
qualifying for protection of the Due Process 
Q 
E. C. Bolmeier, Legality of Student Disciplinary 
Practices. (The Michie Company, Charlottesville, 
Virginia), 1976, p. 135. 
9 
Thomas N. Jones, and Darel P. Semler, ed., 
School Law Update. 1985, "Who Runs the Schools: Judges 
or Educators?," (National Organization on Legal Prob­
lems of Education, Topeka, Kansas), 1985, p. 3. 
10Goss v. Lopez, supra note #6. 
11Ibid. 
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Clause, and due process requires, in connec­
tion with a suspension of 10 days or less, 
that the student be given oral or written 
notice of the charges against him and, if he 
denies them, an explanation of the evidence 
the authorities have and an opportunity to 
present his side of the story. The clause 
requires at least these rudimentary precau­
tions against unfair or mistaken findings of 
misconduct and arbitrary exclusion from 
school... 
We should also make it clear that we 
have addressed ourselves solely to the short 
suspension, not exceeding 10 days. Longer 
suspension or expulsions for the remainder of 
the school term, or permanently, may require 
more formal procedures. Nor do we put aside 
the possibility that in unusual situations, 
although involving only a short suspension, 
something more than the rudimentary proce­
dure will be required.12 
In the 1975 Wood v. Stricklandl3 decision, the 
United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 vote, ruled that 
school board members, as individuals, are not Immune 
from liability for compensating damages under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871 which states in part: 
Every person who under cover of any sta­
tute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage 
of any State, subjects or causes to be sub­
jected any citizen of the U.S to depriva­
tion of any rights, privileges and immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall 
be liable to the party injured in an action 
at law, suit in equity or other proper pro-
12Ibid. 
13 Wood v. Strickland, supra note #7. 
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ceedings for redress.14 
Under Section 1983 of the 1871 Civil Rights Acts, 
individuals who allege a denial of due process may 
bring action for declaratory and injunctive relief 
against the school board and administrators involved. 
Plaintiffs may also bring action for financial damages 
against individuals who made the decision.15 The Court 
insisted that school board members could be held liable 
for acts which violate a student's constitutional 
rights.16 The Court established a standard for "good 
faith" immunity by stating: 
The official must himself be acting sin­
cerely and with a belief that he is doing 
right, but an act violating a student's con­
stitutional rights can be no more justified 
by ignorance or disregard of settled, indis­
putable law on the part of one entrusted with 
supervision of students* daily lives than by 
the presence of actual malice. To be enti­
tled to a special exemption from the categor­
ical remedial language of 1983 in a case in 
which his action violated a student's consti­
tutional rights, a school board member, who 
has voluntarily undertaken the task of super­
14The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. pl983 
(1970) . 
15Robert E. Phay, "Individual Liability of School 
Board Members and School Administrators," School Law 
Bulletin. No. 4 at 3 (Oct. 1973). 
16 
Wood v. Strickland, supra note #7. 
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vising the operation of the school and the 
activities of the students, must be held to a 
standard of conduct based not only on per­
missible intentions, but also on knowledge of 
the basic unquestioned constitutional rights 
of his charges.17 
In 1978, the case of Carey v, Piphusl8 came before 
the Court. In an 8 - 0 decision, (excluding Justice 
Blackmun) the Court ruled suspended students whose due 
process rights are violated in elementary and secondary 
schools would be entitled only to nominal damages. 
Justice Powell rendered the opinion of the Court in 
which Justices Burger, Brennan, Stewart, White, 
Rehnquist, and Stevens joined. The District Court held 
that both students had been suspended without procedur­
al due process, but declined to award damages because 
"the record is completely devoid of any evidence which 
could even form the basis of a speculative inference 
measuring the extent of their injuries. Plaintiffs' 
claims for damages therefore fail for complete lack of 
proof."19 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and re­
17Ibid. 
18Carev v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 98 S. Ct. 1042, 
55 L. Ed. 2d. 252 (1978). 
19Ibid. 
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manded holding that the District Court had erred in not 
granting declaratory and injunctive relief. The Court 
ruled: 
...even if the District Court found on 
remand that respondents' suspensions were 
justified, they would be entitled to recover 
substantial nonpunitive damages simply be­
cause they had been denied procedural due 
process.20 
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, 
the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. In 
his opinion, Justice Powell stated: 
Because the right to procedural due pro­
cess is absolute in the sense that it does 
not depend upon the merits of a claimant's 
substantive assertions, and because of the 
importance to organized society that proce­
dural due process be observed, we believe 
that the denial of procedural due process 
should be actionable for nominal damages 
without proof of actual injury. We therefore 
hold that if, upon remand, the District Court 
determines that respondents' suspensions 
were justified, respondents nevertheless 
will be entitled to recover nominal damages, 
not to exceed one dollar, from petitioners.21 
Until 1978, school boards and school systems, as 
governmental entities, were considered immune from Sec­
tion 1983 suits because they were not 'persons' who 
20Ibid. 
21Ibid. 
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could be sued under the law.22 This theory emerged 
from the 1961 case cited as Monroe v. Pape.23 in 1978, 
the United States Supreme Court nullified that theory 
in the case of Monell v. New York City Department of 
Social Services.24 The court ruled that governing 
boards are not immune from liability and can be sued as 
persons under Section 1983.25 
As a result of the Monell26 decision, the question 
arose whether a local school board, as a governmental 
entity, might be entitled to some sort of qualified 
immunity based on its good faith or that of its employ­
ees. The question was answered by the United States 
Supreme Court in 1980 in the case of Owen v. City of 
Independence, Missouri.27 The Court ruled that local 
22 Richard Swartz, of the Raleigh law firm of 
Tharrington, Smith, and Hargrove, from an unpublished 
paper entitled, " Potential Liability of Principals 
for Violations of Legal Rights." 
23 
Monroe v. Pape. 365 U. S. 167, 81 S. Ct. 473 
(1961). 
24 Monell v. New York City Department of Social 
Services. 436 U. S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978). 
25Ibid. 
26Ibid. 
27 Owen v. City of Independence, Mo.. 445 U. S. 
622, 100 S. Ct. 1398, (1980). 
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governments and their boards, as governmental entities, 
are not entitled to any type of immunity, whatsoever, 
in Section 1983 cases. The Court ruled that local 
boards are strictly liable for violations of rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution, even though their indi­
vidual board members and employees may be entitled to 
qualified good faith immunity from personal liability 
as stated in the Wood28 decision.29 
Another 1980 United States Supreme Court decision 
greatly expanded an individual's ability to sue and col­
lect damages under Section 1983. In the case of Maine 
v. Thiboutot,30 the Court ruled that suit may be 
brought for the violation of any right guaranteed by 
any law under Section 1983. Previously, a suit could 
only be filed for constitutional violations or for vio­
lations regarding civil rights. Another stipulation of 
the Maine31 case is that attorneys' fees may be as-
28 Wood v. Strickland, supra note #7. 
29 
Edmund Reutter Jr. , The Supreme Court's Impact 
on Public Education, (Phi Delta Kappa and the National 
Organization on Legal Problems of Education, Topeka, 
Kansas) 1982, 158 - 163. 
qn 
Maine v. Thiboutot. 448 U. S. 1, 100 S. Ct. 2502 
(1980). 
31Ibid. 
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sessed to the losing party.32 ThiS stipulation was 
carried one step further in another 1980 case, Maher v. 
Gagne.33 The Court ruled that attorneys1 fees may be 
awarded even if the case were settled out of court.34 
Another recent decision by the high Court has made 
it potentially easier to prove a Section 1983 claim 
against school officials. In Gomez v. Toledo,35 the 
Supreme Court ruled that a person bringing suit has no 
obligation (as had been implied in the Wood36 deci­
sion) to plead or prove that officials acted in bad 
faith. The qualified good faith immunity of school 
officials was not affected by the Gomez37 decision. The 
decision shifts the burden of proof to the defendant 
rather than the plaintiff.38 
The Burger Court signaled in 1978 that it was un-
32 
Reutter, supra note #29. 
33 
Maher v. Gaone. 448 U. S. 122, 100 S. Ct. 2570 
(1980). 
34Ibid. 
OR 
Gomez v. Toledo. 446 U. S. 635 (1980). 
3 6 
Wood v. Strickland, supra note #7. 
37 
Gomez v. Toledo, supra note #35. 
38 
Swartz, supra note #22. 
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willing to identify new areas of student rights in the 
case of Ingraham v. Wright. 39 This case answered two 
questions which are of significance to all educational 
administrators: (1) Are students entitled to a due pro­
cess hearing prior to the administration of corporal 
punishment?, and (2) Is corporal punishment a violation 
of the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual pun­
ishment? The Court ruled that students are not enti­
tled to a due process hearing prior to the adminis­
tration of corporal punishment. Also, the Court ruled 
that corporal punishment is not a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punish­
ment. 40 
Horowitz v. University of Missouri.41 another 1978 
case, gave further indication that the Burger Court was 
reluctant to identify new areas of student rights. 
While this case did not involve public school students, 
the decision, nevertheless, carries serious implica­
tions for students in public schools. The Court ruled 
Inqraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 97 S. Ct. 
1401, 51 L. Ed. 2d 711, 1977. 
41 
Horwitz v. University of Missouri, 435 U. S. 78, 
(1978). 
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that students are not entitled to a due process hearing 
prior to academic dismissal.42 Both cases, Ingraham43 
and Horowitz,44 give a strong indication that the 
Burger Court was unwilling to expand the due process 
rights of students beyond the narrow disciplinary pen­
alties outlined in Goss v. Lopez.45 
Right to Free Speech 
(Amendment I) 
On December 15, 1791, the Constitution of the 
United States was amended by the adoption of the First 
Amendment which reads: 
Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the government for a redress of 
grievances.46 
Throughout the early history of public 
education in this nation, students usually 
played a submissive role within their 
schools. With few exceptions, the general 
43 
Inqraham v. Wright, supra note #39. 
44 
Horwitz v. University of Missouri, supra note 
#41. 
45 
Goss v. Lopez. supra note #6. 
46 
United States Constitution. Amendment I. 
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rule was that students did not express them­
selves in ways deemed 'unacceptable* by their 
administrators or teachers. Typically, stu­
dents dressed in particular ways prescribed 
by a school dress code, spoke out in class 
only when encouraged to do so by their teach­
ers, and usually abstained from placing any 
items in school publications which had not 
received prior approval of the school admin­
istration or their faculty sponsor.47 
Needless to say, the role of the student has chang­
ed dramatically in recent years. The courts have in­
terpreted the term "freedom of speech" to be a many-fa­
ceted term which includes: students speaking out on 
campus, students' dress, hairstyles, and symbolic ex­
pressions such as the wearing of armbands, buttons, 
badges hairstyles. The First Amendment also addresses 
free press, assembly, and redress for grievances.48 
"Like every other public institution, the schools are 
occupied by people whose duties and liberties are in 
conflict."49 Thus, the courts are called upon to set­
tle these conflicts. 
47 H. C. Hudgins, Jr., and Richard S. Vacca, Law 
and Education: Contemporary Issues and Court Decisions, 
(The Michie Company, Charlottesville, Virginia), 1985, 
p. 319. 
48Ibid., p. 321. 
49 
Willian W. Justice, Phi Delta Kappan, "Teaching 
the Bill of Rights," October 1986, p. 155. 
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According to Thomas J. Flygare, an attorney with 
the New Hampshire law firm of Sheehan, Phinney, Bass, 
and Green and a contributing editor to the Phi Delta 
Kappan. the case of Tinker v. Pes Moines Independent 
School District 50 ushered in the students' rights move­
ment of the 1970's.51 jn terms of students' rights, 
the Burger Court had to deal with the Tinker52 case, a 
legacy of the Warren Court. As stated in Chapter II of 
this study, Associate Justice Abe Fortas wrote the ma­
jority opinion stating in part that "it can hardly be 
argued that either students or teachers shed their con­
stitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression 
at the school house gate." Justice Fortas continued by 
stating that schools must show "material and substan­
tial disruption" before free expression can be prohi­
bited. 53 
In 1978, the Supreme Court refused to review a low­
er court's decision in the case of Trachtman v. 
50 
Tinker v. Pes Moines, supra note #5. 
51 
Thomas J. Flygare, Phi Delta Kappan, "Is Tinker 
Dead?," October 1986, p. 165. 
52 
Tinker v. Pes Moines, supra note #5. 
53Ibid. 
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Anker.54 This case involved a survey of sexual atti­
tudes which was to be distributed to high school stu­
dents. The results were to be published in the school 
newspaper. The Court ruled that school officials need 
only show a reasonable basis to justify restraints on 
secondary school publications distributed on school 
property. Reason to believe that "harmful consequences 
might result to students" is reason enough to prevent a 
student publication from being distributed.55 
The last students' rights decision rendered by the 
Burger Court was Bethel School District v. Fraser.56 
The case began on April 26, 1983, when Mathew Fraser, a 
senior at Bethel High School, Pierce County, 
Washington, delivered a brief speech nominating another 
student for a seat on the student council. The speech 
contained a series of sexual metaphors which were 
clearly recognized by the students present during as­
sembly. Many students demonstrated understanding of 
the metaphors by "simulating various kinds of behavior 
54 
Trachtman v. Anker. Supreme Court review denied, 
435 U. S. 925 (1978). 
56 
Bethel School District v. Fraser, 478 U. 
S. (1986) . 
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in a graphic manner."57 Subsequently, five teachers in 
the school complained to the assistant principal about 
the speech and suggested that some disciplinary action 
was in order. Following a discussion of the matter 
between Fraser and the assistant principal, Fraser was 
suspended from school for a period of three days for 
violating a school rule prohibiting the use of obscene, 
profane, or suggestive language.58 jn addition, 
Fraser*s name was removed from a list of candidates 
for graduation speaker at the school's graduation exer­
cise. 59 
Fraser began the judicial process by seeking re­
view of this disciplinary action through the school 
district's grievance procedures, but a hearing officer 
determined that the speech given by Fraser was "inde­
cent, lewd, and offensive to the modesty and decency of 
many of the students and faculty in attendance...." 
The examiner concluded that the speech embodied terms 
within the ordinary meaning of the word "obscene" as 
57 
A Legal Memorandum, "U.S. Supreme Court Reviews 
Student Freedom of Speech," September 1986, p. 1. 
58Ibid., p2. 
59Ibid., p.3. 
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used in the school's rule and declared the school's 
disciplinary action correct.60 Praser then appealed 
to the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Washington. The court ruled that Fraser's 
First Amendment constitutional rights were violated 
because the school rule was too vague and broad, and 
the approved speakers list for graduation ceremonies 
was not included in the school discipline code.61 on 
appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the deci­
sion was affirmed, citing the case of Tinker v. Pes 
Moines.62 The court stated that it saw no difference 
between Fraser's speech and the wearing of black arm­
bands in the Tinker case.63 
The school system appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court, and on July 7, 1986, on a vote of 7-2, 
the Court reversed the decision of the lower courts. 
Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote the majority opinion 
stating in part: 
60Ibid. 
61Ibid. 
62Ibid. 
63Ibid. 
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...that public education must prepare 
pupils for citizenship in the Republic... it 
must inculcate the habits and manners of ci­
vility as values in themselves conducive to 
happiness and as indispensable to the prac­
tice of self-government in the community and 
the nation.64 
For the first time, the Court attempted to spell 
out the limitations of free speech for public school 
students. Justice Burger continued his litany by stat­
ing in part: 
We affirmed that the constitutional 
rights of students in public school are not 
automatically co-extensive with the rights of 
adults in other settings... The holdings of 
the Eraser decision are, as always, limited 
to the specific issues before the Court. 
Even these make clear, however, that whatever 
the First Amendment rights of public school 
students may be, they do not include the un­
fettered use of language which the school 
district or its administrators believe to be 
'offensively lewd and indecent1 even if it is 
not disruptive of the educational process."65 
Justice Burger referred to Justice Black's dis­
senting opinion in the Tinker 66 case in rendering his 
opinion. Justice Black, in his dissenting opinion in 
64 
Bethel School District v. Fraser. supra note 
#56. 
65Ibid. 
66 
Tinker v. Pes Moines, supra note #5. 
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the Tinker case stated: 
I wish, therefore.... to disclaim any 
purpose.... to hold that the federal 
Constitution compels the teachers, parents 
and elected school officials to surrender 
control of the American public school system 
to public school students.67 
In 1972, the Burger Court denied a writ of 
certiorari in the case of Karr v. Schmidt68 effectively 
upholding the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in a case concerning length of hair. The court 
asserted that a school board has a legitimate concern 
and an undeniable interest in "teaching hygiene, in­
stilling discipline, asserting authority, and compell­
ing uniformity."69 In 1982, the Fifth Circuit again 
upheld the authority of a school board to regulate 
hairstyles in the case of Domico v. Rapides Parish 
School Board70 citing its 1972 decision (Karr71) which 
was effectively upheld when the United States Supreme 
68Karr v. Schmidt. 460 F. 2d 609 (5th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1982). 
'69 
Ibid. 
70 
Domico v. Rapides Parish School Board, 675 F. 2d 
100 ( 5th Cir. 1982). 
71 
Karr v. Schmidt, supra note #68. 
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Court denied a writ of certiorari. "In general, puni­
tive action against students for violating a hair style 
regulation is unconstitutional unless positive proof is 
given to show that it is: (1) disruptive?2, (2) unsani­
tary^, or (3) dangerous74."75 
More than a hundred cases regarding hairstyles 
have been litigated since 1965 when the first case to 
reach a court of record was decided.76 "The great ma­
jority of the cases are recent and, for the most part, 
stem from the holding of the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Tinker."77 It can be concluded that 
school boards do have the constitutional authority to 
regulate length of hair as long as the regulations are 
72 Dawson v. Hillsborough County. Fla. School 
Board. 322 F. Supp. 286 (Fla. 1971). 
73 
Turley v. Adel Community School District. 322 F. 
Supp. 402 (Iowa, 1971). 
74 
Lanbert v. Marushi. 322 F. Supp. 326 (W. Va. 
1971). 
75 
Bolmeier, supra note #8, p. 25. 
76_.. , 
Ibid. 
77 
Pound v. Holladav. 322 F. Supp. 1000 (Miss., 
1971) . 
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not arbitrary or capricious.78 
Right to Religious Freedom 
(Amendment I) 
The question of student rights in a religious 
context is complex. The central issues in the 
religious arena are: (1) Can American public school 
children be required to participate in legislatively 
mandated religious activities? and (2) Do American 
public school students have a constitutional right to 
receive an education in the school of their choice ( 
either public, private, or parochial) and receive 
financial assistance from the state? This section of 
the study will review and analyze United States Supreme 
Court decisions which addressed these central issues. 
The decisions rendered by the Warren Court in the 
cases of Enqel v. Vitale79 and Abinqton School District 
v. Schempp80 did not bring to a close the litigation 
over religious matters in the public schools. Well-
78 
H.C. Hudgins, Jr., and Richard S. Vacca, Law and 
Education; Contemporary Issues and Court Decisions. 
(The Michie Company, Charlottesville, Virginia) 1985, 
p. 324. 
79 
Enqel v. Vitale. (N.Y.), 370 U. S. 421, 82 S. 
Ct. 1261 (1962). 
80 
Abinqton School District v. Schempp (Pa.), 374 
U. S. 203, 83 S. Ct. 1560 (1963). 
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organized groups, dissatisfied with public schools and 
with excessive governmental control, are influencing 
citizens to crusade to "clean up" material presented 
to students. These groups focus criticism on books 
and other materials which present ideas they oppose in 
the areas of religion, politics, and morality.81 
The Warren Court's decisions in the cases of Enqel 
v. Vitale82 and Abinqton School District v. Schempp83 
were a prelude to the development of the tripart test 
which was developed by the Burger Court in the 1971 
decision of Lemon v. Kurtzman.84 The tripart test asks 
three questions: (1) Does the act have a secular legis­
lative purpose?, (2) Does the primary effect of the act 
either advance or inhibit religion?, and (3) Does the 
act excessively entangle government and religion?85 
81 
Joseph Bryson and Elizabeth Detty, Censorship of 
Public School Library and Instructional Material, (The 
Michie Company, Charlottesville, Virginia), 1982, pp. 
1-7. 
Q 9 
Enqel v. Vitale. supra note #79. 
83 Abinqton School District v. Schempp, supra note 
#80. 
84 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 91 S. Ct. 
2105, 29 L. Ed. 2d 745, 404 U.S. 876 (1971). 
O R 
Hudgins, supra note #78. 
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The tripart test remains the Court's primary judicial 
First Amendment religious establishment standard.86 
According to Vincent Blasi of Yale University, 
"The Burger Court's addiction to uneasy, middle-of-the-
road doctrines is nowhere more apparent than in the 
series of judgments regarding the highly emotional is­
sue of public assistance to religious schools."87 jn 
1973, three cases of a religious nature, destined to 
become landmark decisions, came before the Court; 
Sloan v. Lemon.88 the Committee for Public Education 
and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist (P.E.A.R.L.),89 and 
Levitt v. P.E.A.R.L.90 Immediately following the Lemon 
v. Kurtzman91 decision (Lemon I), the Pennsylvania le-
86 
Joseph Bryson, "The Supreme Court and Social 
Change," from a speech delivered at the Guilford Col­
lege School Law Conderence, June 20, 1984. 
87 
Vincent Blasi, The Burger Court: The Coun­
ter-Revolution That Wasn't. (Yale University Press, New 
Haven and London), 1983, p. 214. 
Qfl 
Sloan v. Lemon. 413 U. S. 825, 93 S. Ct. 2982 37 
L. Ed. 2d 151 (1973). 
89 
Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty 
v. Nvguist. 413 U. S. 756, 93 S. Ct. 2955, 37 L. Ed. 2d 
948 (1973). 
90 
Levitt v. P.E.A.R.L.. 413 U. S. 472, 93 S. Ct. 
2814, 37 L. Ed. 2d 736 (1973). 
91 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra note #84. 
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gislature attempted to bypass the Court's directive by 
passing into law the Parent Reimbursement Act. This 
law granted tuition reimbursements to parents of child­
ren attending private and parochial schools. The Court 
found this act unconstitutional in the case of Sloan v. 
Lemon(Lemon II).92 a similar legislative act in New 
York state was found unconstitutional by the Court in 
the case of the Committee for Public Education and Re­
ligious Liberty v. Nvauist93. in Levitt94, the Court 
ruled that New York State's reimbursement to nonpublic 
schools for costs involved in testing, maintaining re­
cords, and compiling reports constituted an impermissi­
ble aid to religion.95 These legislative acts,in open 
defiance of Supreme Court decisions, were intended to 
funnel funds into religious schools. These specific 
statutes were eventually declared unconstitutional by 
the courts.96 
The religious issue, in historical retrospect, 
92 Sloan v. Lemon, supra note #88. 
93 P.E.A.R.L.. supra note #89. 
94 
Levitt v. P.E.A.R.L., supra note #90. 
95Ibid. 
96Bryson, supra note #86. 
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reached a constitutional plateau in the 1975 Meek v. 
Plttenqer case.97 The circumstances of the Meek deci­
sion were construed to be devastating to political and 
religious leaders who sought legislative enactments 
supporting public funds for religious schools. The 
Court appeared to truncate almost every conceivable 
possibility of "auxiliary services." The historical 
record indicates that that appearance was deceiving. 
In a 6-3 decision, the Court ruled as constitutional 
the policy of the state's lending textbooks to students 
in private and parochial schools. However, by an iden­
tical 6-3 vote, the same Court ruled that the "direct 
loan of instructional materials and equipment has the 
unconstitutional effect of advancing religion because 
of the predominantly religious character of the schools 
benefiting from the Act."98 
In 1977, the Court signaled a new direction in the 
case of Wolman v. Walter." The Court addressed six 
kinds of services in its decision. The Court held as 
97Meek v. Pittenqer, 421 U.S. 602 (1975). 
98-.., 
Ibid. 
99 
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 97 S. Ct. 2593, 
53 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1977) . 
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constitutional the practice of states providing text­
books to private and parochial schools (5-4), the fi­
nancing of therapeutic, remedial, and guidance services 
for private and parochial schools (8-1), the financing 
of diagnostic services in speech and hearing (7-2), and 
the financing of standardized tests and test scoring in 
private and parochial schools (5-4). The Court held as 
unconstitutional the practice of the state providing 
field trips (5-4) and audio-visual equipment (6-3) to 
private and parochial schools.100 
In 1980, the Court reversed Levitt 101in a case 
known as Regan*02with the Court voting 5-4. In 1983, 
the Supreme Court rendered its most far-reaching deci­
sion in a decade in the 5-4 decision of Mueller v. 
Allen.103 The Court, in effect, reversed more than a 
decade of decisions concerning tax credits, parental 
reimbursements and parental tax deductions. The 
100 Ibid. 
101Levitt v. P.E.A.R.L., supra note #90. 
102Committee v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646 (1980). 
103Mueller v. Allen. 103 S. Ct. 3062, 77 L. Ed. 2d 
721 (1983). 
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Mueller10^ decision concerned a Minnesota legislative 
act which allowed parents to deduct expenses incurred 
by attendance of their children to all elementary and 
secondary schools. The inclusion of the word all in 
the act allowed it to stand constitutionally. The 
Mueller105 decision may be the single most important 
Supreme Court decision affecting public education since 
the Brown106 decision of 1953. This decision greatly 
expanded the constitutional right of all children to 
seek an education in the school system of their choice, 
whteher public, private, or parochial and to receive 
financial reimbursement from the state.107 
Two 1985 decisions answered the question concern­
ing the right of private school students to receive 
instruction from state-paid teachers. Both decisions, 
Grand Rapids v. Ball108 (5-4) and Aquilar v. Feltsn,109 
104Ibid. 
105 Ibid. 
1Q6 Brown v. Board of Education (Kan.), 347 U. S. 
483, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954). 
107Bryson, supra note #86. 
108 Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 105 S. 
Ct. 3216 (1985). 
109 Aquilar v. Felton. 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985). 
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(8-1) invalidated programs in Michigan and New York 
that were designed to provide supplementary educational 
services to children attending private religious 
schools.110 The Court ruled that state-paid teachers 
teaching in private parochial schools was a violation 
of the Establishment Clause of the Constitution of the 
United States and created an unacceptable level of en­
tanglement between church and state.111 These deci­
sions indicate that the wall between church and state 
is still intact. 
In sum, our country will continue to 
struggle with the elemental tension between a 
religiously devout but diverse people and a 
secular government. Barring a celestial mir­
acle, the truth is not likely to be found, 
even by those who now so earnestly debate the 
issues.112 
Right to Freedom From Illegal 
Search and Seizure 
(Amendment IV) 
In recent years, the question of illegal search 
and seizure of students in public schools has become an 
110Deskbook Encyclopedia of American School Law, 
(Data Research, Inc., Rosemont, Minnesota), 1986, pp. 
206-207. 
11%chool Law Update, 1985, (National Organization 
of Legal Problems of Education, Topeka, Kansas), 1985, 
p. 204. 
n%bid. 
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issue in the normal operation of American public 
schools. A key issue for all students is whether the 
fruits of a search can be introduced into a criminal or 
juvenile court proceeding. A typical situation might 
involve an unannounced search in which an illegal sub­
stance is found. The school administrator would then 
turn over the evidence to either criminal investigators 
or juvenile authorities. Subsequently, the juvenile is 
charged. In court, he and his parents are likely to 
113 
argue that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. 
The Fourth Amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly des­
cribing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.114 
On January 15, 1985, the Burger Court rendered a 
landmark decision in the area of search and seizure in 
the nation's public schools. In the case of New Jersey 
i1^Frank R. Kemerer, and Kenneth L. Deutsch, 
Constitutional Rights and Student Life. (West Publish­
ing Company, St. Paul, Minnesota), 1979, p. 636. 
114United States Constitution. Amendment IV. 
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11S 
v. T.L.O. iJ-D the Court ruled that school administrators 
are not bound by the traditional probable cause stand­
ards required of law enforcement officers in criminal 
proceedings. The Court ruled that a less exacting 
"reasonable suspicion" standard is more appropriate for 
the school setting.116 Justice Byron White wrote the 
opinion for the 6-3 majority. He stated in part: 
...school officials need not obtain a 
warrant before searching a student who is 
under their authority. Moreover, school of­
ficials need not be held subject to the re­
quirement that searches be based on probable 
cause to believe that the subject of the 
search has violated or is violating the law. 
Rather, the legality of a search of a student 
should depend simply on the reasonableness, 
under all the circumstances, of the search. 
Determining the reasonableness of any search 
involves a determination of whether the 
search was justified at its inception and 
whether, as conducted, it was reasonably re­
lated in scope to the circumstances that jus­
tified the interference in the first place. 
Under ordinary circumstances the search of a 
student by a school official will be justi­
fied at its inception where there are reason­
able grounds for suspecting that the search 
will turn up evidence that the student has 
violated or is violating either the law or 
115New Jersey v. T.L.O.. 105 S. Ct. 733, 83 L. Ed. 
2d 19 (1985). 
116 Ibid. 
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the rules of the school.117 
Right to Receive Information 
and Ideas (Amendment I) 
The 1973 Miller118 decision led to an increase in 
censorship litigation on the local level. The United 
States Supreme Court declined to establish a national 
standard on what constitutes obscenity. State laws 
based on "community standards" were given guidelines by 
the Supreme Court in judging, as obscene, materials 
under consideration. The opinion stated: "We emphasize 
that it is not our function to propose regulatory 
schemes for the States. That must await their concrete 
legislative efforts."119 
The landmark Tinker1^ case established a prece­
dent which has been followed in case law since 1969. 
The Tinker decision stated: 
First Amendment rights, applied in light 
of the special characteristics of the school 
environment, are available to teachers and 
students. It can hardly be argued that eith-
117Ibid. 
118Miller v. California. 413 U. S. 15, 93 S. Ct. 
2607, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1973). 
119Ibid. 
120Tinker v. Pes Moines, supra note #5. 
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er students or teachers shed their constitu­
tional rights to freedom of speech or expres­
sion at the school house gate.121 
School boards are empowered through state statutes 
to prescribe curricula. Authority to select textbooks, 
library books, and other instructional materials is 
lOO 
derived from the same source. it logically follows 
that school personnel do not have unreviewable privi­
leges to select library and instructional materials. 
The authority to approve or disapprove such action is 
within the scope of school boards.123 However, there 
are constitutional limitations on the discretion of 
school boards to review and remove books and materials 
from school libraries. 
Selection and censorship are distinguishable. 
Selection is a process whereby specific materials are 
chosen from all available materials, limited only by 
educational considerations, budget, and space. Censor­
ship, on the other hand, permanently limits access to 
121Ibid. 
122E.C. Bolmeier, School in The Legal Structure, 
(The W.H. Anderson Company, Cincinnati, Ohio), 1973, 
p.100. 
123Julia Turnquist Bradley, "Censoring the School 
Library: Do Students Have the Right to Read", 
Connecticut Law Review. (Spring, 1978): 757. 
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books and materials based on the value or prejudice of 
an individual or group.124 An article in the 
Connecticut Law Review states: 
A case in which a school board seeks to 
censor library books provides the court with 
an ideal opportunity to apply principles of 
academic freedom to secondary schools, with­
out judicially mandating a particular theory 
of educational purpose and without altering 
the traditional structure of American educa­
tion.12^ 
Recent decisions illustrate that courts have divi­
ded opinions censorship by school boards. Although 
courts generally uphold school boards in the day-to-day 
administration of schools, recent case law has estab­
lished a trend toward upholding academic freedom for 
teachers and the right to receive information by stu­
dents.126 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes identified the li­
brary as "a marketplace of ideas" as early as 1919.127 
Recent Supreme Court decisions support the constitu-
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid. 
126Bryson, supra note #81, p. 85. 
127Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630, 40 
S. Ct. 17, 63 L. Ed. 1173 (1919). 
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tional right to receive information. In the 1967 
Kevishian decision, the Court stated: 
...an education system best serves demo­
cracy when it teaches through wide exposure 
to that robust exchange of ideas which dis­
covers truth out of a multitude of tongues 
rather than through any kind of authoritative 
selection.128 
The Burger Court addressed the issue of censorship 
in public schools in the 1976 case cited as Minarcini 
v. Stronqsville City School District.129 The Court 
upheld the ruling of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
when it refused to review the case. The Sixth Circuit 
ruled neither the state nor the school board is requir­
ed to establish libraries in schools. Once established 
a library becomes a privilege that cannot be withdrawn 
because of political or social tastes of the school 
board. The court further ruled that library books can 
be removed only for constitutionally allowable rea­
sons.130 To do otherwise is a violation of a student's 
128Kevishian v. Board of Regents. 385 U. S. 589, 
87 S. Ct. 675, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1967). 
129Minarcini v. Stronqsville City School District. 
384 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Ohio 1974, aff'd in part, rev'd 
in part, 541 F. 2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976). 
13°Ibid. 
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1 
First Amendment rights to receive information. 
The most recent case heard by the Burger Court 
concerning censorship was Board of Education. Island 
132 
Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico. 
The Court noted that the First Amendment limits a 
board's discretion to remove books from school librar­
ies. While local boards have broad discretion in the 
management of school affairs, that discretion must be 
exercised in a manner compatible with the First Amend­
ment. The rights of students must be considered. 
While this must be done in light of special character­
istics of the school environment, the special charac­
teristics of the school library make that environment 
especially appropriate for the recognition of First 
Amendment rights. The court ruled that the board might 
rightfully claim absolute discretion in curriculum mat­
ters. That discretion, with its regime of voluntary 
inquiry, cannot extend beyond the compulsory environ­
ment of the classroom.133 
131Ibid. 
132 Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free 
School District No. 26 v. Pico. 457 U. S. 853, 102 S. 
Ct. 2799, 73 L. Ed. 2d435 (1982). 
13%bid. 
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Summary 
Five major issues have been addressed in this 
chapter concerning the constitutional rights of public 
secondary and elementary students. They are: (1) the 
right to due process, (2) the right to free speech, (3) 
the right to religious freedom, (4) the right to free­
dom from illegal search and seizure, and (5) the right 
to receive information and ideas. Based on an analysis 
of the cases which came before the Burger Court for 
interpretation, the Court most often favored the au­
thority of school administrators to maintain control 
over the public schools in the United States. The 
Court often expresses reluctance to become entangled in 
the daily school operation in which school boards and 
school administrators are vested with authority. How­
ever, it is clear that the Court will become involved 
if a student is denied his constitutional right to due 
process. The Tinker1^ case remains the staunch prece­
dent on which many major educational decisions have 
been based since 1968. 
Clearly, the Burger Court was committed to the 
concept of "separation of church and state." The tri-
13*Tinker v. Pes Moines, supra note #5. 
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part test, developed by the Court in 1971, remains the 
Court's primary judicial First Amendment religious es­
tablishment standard.135 However, the 1983 Mueller136 
decision resulted in the emergence of a conflicting 
judicial philosophy from the Burger Court. This deci­
sion, in effect, reversed more than a decade of deci­
sions concerning tax credits, parental reimbursements 
and parental tax deductions. 
The Burger Court also clarified that public school 
students are not entitled to the same constitutional 
considerations as adults. In New Jersey v. T.L.O.137. 
a search and seizure case, the Burger Court ruled that 
a less exacting "reasonable suspicion" standard is more 
appropriate for the school setting.138 
The Burger Court set the standard for the removal 
139 
of books from school libraries in the Pico case in 
1982. The Court noted that the First Amendment limits 
1 IS 1JJSloan v. Lemon, supra note #88. 
136Mueller v. Allen, supra note #103. 
137New Jersey v. T.L.O., supra note #115. 
138 Ibid. 
139Board of Education v. Pico, supra note #132. 
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a board's discretion to remove books from school lib­
raries. Removal of books from a school library must 
not be predicated on personal, political, or religious 
ideologies. 
Thus, the Burger Court leaves the American judici­
al scene with conflicting judicial philosophies. One ds 
a philosophy which gives school administrators great 
leeway in administering the nation's public schools; 
the other is a philosophy that recognizes the basic 
right of Students to the protection of the United 
States Constitution. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS AND REVIEW OF UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
1969 -1986 
This chapter presents an analysis and review of 
United States Supreme Court decisions rendered by the 
Burger Court from 1969 to 1986. An overview of each 
category in Chapters One and Three is presented. These 
categories are: (1) right to due process, (2) right to 
free speech, (3) right to religious freedom, (4) right 
to freedom from illegal searches and seizures, and (5) 
right to receive information and ideas. An overview 
and discussion of each case is presented beginning with 
a review of the facts subsequent to each case. Cate­
gories and cases are listed below: 
1. Right to Due Process: 
Goss v. Lopez (1975). 
Wood v. Strickland (1975). 
Carey v. Piphus (1978). 
Inqraham v. Wright (1977). 
2. Right to Free Speech: 
Bethel School District v. Fraser (1986). 
3. Right to Religious Freedom: 
Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971). 
Lemon v. Kurtzman (1973). 
P.E.A.R.L. v. Nyquist (1975). 
Levitt v. P.E.A.R.L. (1975). 
Meek v. Pittenqer (1975). 
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Wolman v. Walter (1977). 
P.E.A.R.L. v. Regan (1980). 
Mueller v. Allen (1983). 
Grand Rapids School District v. Ball (1985). 
Aquilar v. Felton (1985). 
Wallace v. Jeffree (1985). 
4. Right to Freedom from Illegal Searches and 
Seizures: 
New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985). 
5. Right to Receive Information and Ideas 
Minarcini v. Stronasville City School District 
119761. 
Board of Education. Island xrees Union free 
School District No.26 v. Pico (1982). 
Only decisions from the United States Supreme 
Court are reviewed which influence the constitutional 
rights of students. These decisions are important 
because they establish significant llegal precedents in 
education. 
Right to Due Process 
(Amendment XIV) 
The right to due process is protected by Amendment 
XIV of the United States Constitution. Goss v. Lopez. 
Wood v. Strickland, Carey v. Piphus, and Inqraham v. 
Wright. the four cases presented in this category, 
are significant because these cases support the right 
to due process for public elementary and secondary stu­
dents. These cases emphasize that the state's interest 
in education and the welfare of children must be bal­
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anced against the constitutional rights of students. 
Furthermore, these cases clearly establish that stu­
dents are entitled to the protection of the 
Constitution of the United States. 
Goss v. Lopez 
419 U.S. 565, 
95 S. Ct. 729 
42 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1975) 
Facts 
This case came on an appeal lodged by school ad­
ministrators of the Columbus, Ohio Public School Sys­
tem. The appeal concerned a decision by the federal 
district and circuit court of appeals regarding due 
process of law as it relates to the suspension of stu­
dents. The lower courts ruled that appellees, who were 
high school students in the Columbus School system, 
had been denied their constitutional rights to due pro­
cess following a suspension from high school. The 
facts of the case reveals that students were not given 
a hearing prior to the suspensions or within a reason­
able time thereafter.1 
The school administrators appealed the lower court 
decisions based on the contention that there is not any 
constitutional right to an education at public ex­
pense, and, therefore, students suspended from school 
were not protected by the due process clause. They 
contended that even if the right to a public education 
were protected by the due process clause, it could 
only be considered when an individual is subjected to 
a severe detriment or grievous loss. In this instance, 
the school officials contended that the ten-day suspen­
sion was neither severe nor grievous.2 
Decision 
The United States Supreme Court held, in a 5 - 4 
decision, that education was a property right protected 
by the United States Constitution. Chief Justice 
Burger, along with Justices Powell, Blackmun, and 
Rehnguist dissented. In delivering the opinion of the 
Court, Justice White stated: 
1Goss v. Lopez. 419 U. S. 565, 95 S. Ct. 729, 42 
L. Ed. 725 (1975). 
2Ibid. 
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Having chosen to extend the right to an 
education to people of appellees' class gen­
erally, Ohio may not withdraw that right on 
grounds of misconduct absent fundamentally 
fair procedures to determine whether the mis­
conduct has occurred.3 
The Court outlined the type of process that is due 
to students who are threatened with suspension. The 
Court was very careful not to get involved with debat­
ing the merits of suspension or the right of the school 
officials to suspend students. The Court did state 
that the school must provide an informal hearing proce­
dure for any student who is threatened with suspension 
in order that he might have an opportunity to explain 
his version of the facts. 
Discussion 
This decision confirmes that once a state estab­
lishes a public school system; students may not be ex­
cluded from the system without being afforded the right 
to due process. This right is provided by the Due Pro­
cess Clause of the Constitution in Amendment I. Even a 
3Ibid. 
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short term suspension cannot be imposed on a student 
without providing him a minimum due process hearing. 
Wood v. Strickland 
416 U. S. 935, 
95 S. Ct. 1932, 
40 L. Ed. 2d 285 (1974) 
Facts 
What originated as a "prank" developed into the 
case of Wood v. Strickland.4 Two sixteen-year-old 
girls "spiked" the punch at a school function at the 
urging of fellow classmates. The punch was served 
without anyone's noticing the caper. Nevertheless, 
the girls were suspended from school for violating a 
school regulation. As a result of the disciplinary 
action, the girls sought judicial relief from a dis­
trict court. 
The District Court supported the school board on 
the grounds that the board was "immune from damage 
suits absent proof of malice in the sense of ill will 
4Wood v. Strickland, 416 U. S. 935, 94 S. Ct. 
1932, 40 L. Ed. 2d 285 (1974). 
toward respondents."5 The girls appealed to the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Eight Circuit 
Court of Appeals ruled that the facts showed a viola­
tion of substantive due process. 
Decision 
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the 
Court ruled 5-4 that the girls had not been afforded 
due process of law and that school board members, as 
individuals, are not immune from liability for compen­
sating damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 
Justice White wrote the majority opinion for the Court. 
He was joined in the majority by Justices Douglas, 
Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall. Justice White wrote in 
part: 
Absolute immunity would not be justified 
since it would not sufficiently increase the 
ability of school officials to exercise their 
discretion in a forthright manner to warrant 
the absence of a remedy for students subject­
ed to intentional or other wise inexcusable 
deprivations.... 
A compensatory award will be appropriate 
only if the school board member has acted 
with such an impermissible motivation or with 
such disregard of the student's clearly es­
tablished constitutional rights that his ac­
5Ibid. 
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tion cannot reasonably be characterized as 
being in good faith.6 
Discussion 
Wood v. Strickland establishes legal precedent for 
school board members and school administrators, who 
make and enforce rules and regulations leading to sta­
tutory or constitutional violations, to be held liable 
for monetary damages under Section 1983 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871. School officials may, however, 
possess "good faith" immunity. In establishing a stan­
dard for "good faith" immunity, The Court stated: 
The official must himself be acting sin­
cerely and with a belief that he is doing 
right, but an act violating a student's con­
stitutional rights can be no more justified 
by ignorance or disregard of settled, indis­
putable law on the part of one entrusted with 
supervision of students' daily lives than by 
the presence of actual malice. To be enti­
tled to a special exemption from the ca­
tegorical remedial language of Section 1983 
in a case in which his action violated a stu­
dent's constitutional rights, a school board 
member, who has voluntarily undertaken the 
task of supervising the operation of the 
school and the activities of the students , 
must be held to a standard of conduct based 
not only on permissible intentions, but also 
on knowledge of the basic unquestioned con-
6Ibid. 
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stitutional rights of his charges.1 
Carey v. Piphus 
435 U. S. 237, 
98 S. Ct. 1042, 
55 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1978) 
Facts 
Respondent Jarius Piphus brought suit against the 
principal of the Chicago Vocational High School because 
of an incident that occurred during the 1973-74 school 
year. On January 23, 1974, faculty members observed 
Piphus and another student standing on the periphery of 
the school campus. The faculty members thought the 
boys were passing a marijuana cigarette back and forth 
between each other. When approached, by the faculty 
members, the two boys disposed of the cigarette. One 
of the faculty members testified that the odor of mari­
juana was still in the air when he got near the boys. 
He also observed that Piphus passed a pack of cigarette 
papers to the other boy. 
As a result of the incident, both students receiv­
ed a twenty-day suspension for the possession of drugs. 
The students argued that they had not been smoking 
7Ibid-
marijuana, but the suspension was still imposed. Upon 
receiving notice that her son had been suspended, the 
mother met with the principal to discuss the reasons 
for the suspension. Subsequently, the mother filed 
suit on behalf of her son under Section 1983 of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871. 
The District Court held that both students had 
been suspended without procedural due process, but de­
clined to award damages because: 
...the record is completely devoid of 
any evidence which could even form the basis 
of a speculative inference measuring the ex­
tent of their injuries. Plaintiffs' claims 
for damages therefore fail for complete lack 
of proof.8 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and re­
manded the decision holding that the District Court had 
erred in not granting declaratory and injunctive re­
lief, and found that: 
...even if the District Court found on 
remand that respondents' suspensions were 
justified, they would be entitled to recover 
substantial nonpunitive damages simply be­
cause they had been denied procedural due 
process.9 
8Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 98 S. Ct. 1042, 
55 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1978). 
9Ibid. 
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Decision 
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the 
Court narrowed the question to whether or not "damages 
should be presumed to flow from every deprivation of 
procedural due process."10 The question facing the 
Court was, "Is the defendant entitled to recover sub­
stantial nonpunitive damages or only nominal dam-
ages?"ll The Court never questioned the assertion of 
the lower court that the procedural due process rights 
of the defendant were denied. 
Justice Powell rendered the opinion of the Court 
in which Justices Burger, Brennan, Stewart, White, 
Rehnquist, and Stevens joined. Justice Marshall con­
curred with the decision and Justice Blackmun took no 
part in the consideration or decision of the case. The 
Court held that damages should be awarded only to com­
pensate actual injury, or in the case of exemplary or 
punitive damages, to deter or punish malicious depriva­
tions of rights. The Court ruled that the students 
were entitled to recover only nominal damages which the 
10Ibid. 
11Ibid. 
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Court set at $1.00.12 
Discussion 
The respondent's argument is twofold: (1) that 
substantial damages should be granted under Section 
1983 for the deprivation of a constitutional right, whe­
ther or not any injury was caused, and (2) that every 
deprivation of constitutional rights, in this case pro­
cedural due process, may be presumed to induce some in­
jury. The petitioners argued that "unless the respon­
dents prove that they actually were injured by the de­
privation of procedural due process, they are entitled 
at most to nominal damages."13 
Justice Powell wrote in part: 
...that although mental and emotional 
distress caused by the denial of procedural 
due process itself is compensable under Sec­
tion 1983, we hold that neither the likeli­
hood of such injury nor the difficulty of 
proving it is so great as to justify awarding 
compensatory damages without proof that such 
injury actually was caused...It remains true 
to principle that substantial damages should 
be awarded only to compensate actual injury 
or, in the case of exemplary or punitive dam­
ages, to deter or punish malicious depriva­
tions of rights... 
12Ibid. 
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Because the right to procedural due pro­
cess is absolute in the sense that it does 
not depend upon the merits of a claimant's 
substantive assertions, and because of the 
importance to organized society that proce­
dural due process be observed, we believe 
that the denial of procedural due process 
should be actionable for nominal damages 
without proof of actual injury. We therefore 
hold that, if pensions were justified, re­
spondents nevertheless will be entitled to 
recover nominal damages, not to exceed one 
dollar, from petitioners.14 
Ingraham v. Wright 
430 U. S. 651, 
97 S. Ct. 1401, 
51 L. Ed. 2d 711. 
Facts 
This case involved two junior high school stu­
dents, who challenged the paddling they had received at 
Drew Junior High School in Dade County, Florida. The 
parents of the boys filed suit on behalf of the boys. 
James Ingraham and Roosevelt Andrews received a paddl­
ing from school principal, Willie J. Wright. The pad­
dling Ingraham received was severe enough to produce a 
bruise which required medical attention and absentee­
ism. Andrews was paddled numerous times for minor in­
fractions during the year. One punishment rendered his 
arm useless for a week. Sixteen Drew Junior High 
School students testified that the paddlings received 
by Ingraham and Andrews were not unusual at the 
school.15 
The petitioners challenged the punishment and the 
statutory authorization for using it as cruel and un­
usual punishment under the provisions of the Eighth 
Amendment. The Eighth Amendment is applied to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. The punishment was also chal­
lenged as a violation of procedural due process.16 
A panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals re­
versed the opinion of a lower district court finding: 
...the severity of the paddlings at Drew 
was 'excessive' in a constitutional 
sense....and generally violated the Eighth 
Amendment requirement that punishment not be 
greatly disproportionate to the offenses 
charged.17 
However, upon a rehearing before the full panel of 
15 
Frank R. Kemerer, and Kenneth L. Deutsch, 
Constitutional Rights and Student Life; Value Conflict 
in Law and Education. Cases and Materials, (West Pub­
lishing Company, St. Paul, Minnesota), 1979, pp. 
376-377. 
16Ibid. 
17 E. C. Bolmeier, Legality of Student Disciplinary 
Practices, (The Michie Company, Charlottesville, 
Virginia), 1976, pp. 82-83. 
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judges of the Fifth Circuit, the lower court's decision 
was affirmed. 
Decision 
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the 
Court affirmed the decision of the lower court and 
held that "the Eighth Amendment does not apply to the 
paddling of children as a means of maintaining disci­
pline in public schools."18 The Court further held: 
...that the due process clause does not 
require notice and a hearing prior to the 
imposition of corporal punishment in the pub­
lic schools, as that practice is authorized 
and limited by the common law.19 
Discussion 
Even though the Court has ruled that teachers have 
the right to administer corporal punishment, local 
boards of education or administrative rules can seri­
ously limit its use. Corporal punishment is forbidden 
in the states of New Jersey and Massachusetts by sta-
18Inqraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 97 S. Ct. 
1401, 51 L. Ed. 2d 711. 
19T. . . Ibid. 
tute; in Maryland by policy of the State Board of Edu­
cation, and Pennsylvania unless approved by the local 
board.20 
Right to Free Speech 
(Amendment I) 
The question of free expression has concerned edu­
cators ever since the Warren Court rendered their 
far-reaching decision in the 1969 Tinker21 case. The 
Tinker22 case established the basis on which student 
expression must be judged. Many school administrators 
felt that the opinions of the lower courts were being 
interpreted too broadly, "especially in cases where, 
unlike Tinker23. no kind of political speech was in­
volved. "24 School attorneys often advised against tak­
ing disciplinary action against students who committed 
acts that were contrary to the school administrators' 
20 
H.C. Hudgins, Jr., and Richard S. Vacca, Law and 
Education: Contemporary Issues and Court Decisions, 
(The Michie Company, Charlottesville, Virginia) 1985, 
p. 291. 
21 Tinker v. Pes Moines Independent School 
District. 393 U. S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 
731, (1969). 
22Ibid. 
23Ibid. 
24 A Legal Memorandum, "U.S. Supreme Court Reviews 
Student Freedom of Speech," September 1986, p. 1. 
concept of good conduct. These acts usually did not 
involve the "transmission of ideas," but "merely the 
desire to elicit a laugh or a smile from other stu­
dents, as in the case of T-shirts bearing words or 
phrases of a humorous, but often sexual, nature."25 
pose disciplinary measures on these students because of 
the language used in the Tinker26 case concerning ma­
terial and substantial disruption. This reluctance was 
based on a 1971 United States Supreme Court decision 
cited as Cohen v. California.27 
Indeed, as demonstrated by the Cohen 
case, even the most offensive four-letter 
words do not, in themselves, meet the stan­
dard of obscenity in the absence of a sexual 
meaning or reference.28 
It was against this backdrop that the Burger Court 
rendered its landmark decision in the area of free ex­
pression in public schools. 
2 6 
Tinker v. Pes Moines, supra note #21. 
27Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15 (1971). 
2 8 A Legal Memorandum, supra note #24. 
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Bethel School District v. Fraser 
478 U. S. (1986) . 
Facts 
This case originated when Mathew Fraser, a senior 
at Bethel High School, Pierce County, Washington, spoke 
in a student assembly on behalf of another student, 
campaigning for an office on the student council. 
Fraser's speech took the form of an "extended sexual 
metaphor." The students attending the assembly indi­
cated that they recognized the intent of the message by 
graphically simulating the various types of behavior 
referred to metaphorically by Fraser. Fraser was aware 
of the possibility that his speech may have violated 
school rules after consulting with three teachers for 
their opinion of the speech prior to its delivery. Two 
of the teachers indicated to Fraser that the speech was 
inappropriate and should not be delivered to the stu­
dent body.29 
Fraser was suspended from school by the assistant 
29Ibid. 
principal and informed that he was in violation of 
school rules forbidding the use of obscene language or 
gestures. In addition, Fraser's name was removed from 
a list of candidates who were to deliver a commencement 
speech at the school's graduation ceremonies. 
Fraser filed suit in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Washington. Upon 
review of the case the District Court ruled that 
Fraser's First Amendment rights had been violated. The 
court also ruled that the removal of Fraser's name from 
the list of commencement speakers was a violation of 
his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process because 
there was not any written rule pertaining to this ac­
tion in the school's disciplinary code. In addition, 
the court ruled that the school's rule against the use 
of obscene language was unconstitutionally vague.30 
On appeal to the Ninth United States Circuit Court 
of Appeals, the decision of the lower court was affirm­
ed. The court compared Fraser's speech with the wear­
ing of the black armband by Mary Beth Tinker and refus­
ed to distinguish between the two events. The court 
also rejected the school system's claim that it had an 
30 
Bethel School District v. Fraser, 478 U. S. 
(1986) . 
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interest in protecting an "essentially captive audience 
of minors from lewd and indecent language, even in a 
school-sponsored setting."31 
Decision 
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the 
decision of the lower courts was reversed by a vote of 
7-2. Justices Marshall and Stevens dissented. Chief 
Justice Burger rendered the opinion for the Court. He 
stated in part: 
...public education must prepare pupils 
for citizenship in the Republic... it must 
inculcate the habits and manners of civility 
as values in themselves conducive to happi­
ness and as indispensable to the practice of 
self-government in the community and the na­
tion. . . 
The First Amendment guarantees wide 
freedom in matters of adult public discourse. 
... It does not follow, however, that simply 
because the use of an offensive form of ex­
pression may not be prohibited to adults mak­
ing what the speaker considers a political 
point, that the same latitude must be permit­
ted to children in a public school. 
Surely it is a highly appropriate func­
tion of public school education to prohibit 
the use of vulgar and offensive terms in pub­
lic discourse. Indeed, the fundamental val­
ues necessary to the maintenance of a de­
mocratic political system disfavor the use of 
terms of debate highly offensive or highly 
threatening to others. Nothing in the con-
31 A Legal Memorandum, supra note #24. 
stitution prohibits the states from insisting 
that certain modes of expression are inappro­
priate and subject to sanctions. The incul­
cation of these values is truly the "work of 
the schools." Justice Black, dissenting in 
Tinker made a point that is especially rele­
vant in this case: 
I wish, therefore,....to disclaim 
any purpose.... to hold that the 
federal Constitution compels the 
teachers, parents and elected 
school officials to surrender con­
trol of the American public school 
system to public school stu­
dents. 3 2 
Discussion 
T^e Fraser33 decision has far reaching implica­
tions. For the second time in two years, the Court rul 
ed that a student's constitutional rights are not "co­
extensive" with those of adults. The Court has stated 
that it believes the proper function of the public 
school system is to teach certain fundamental values. 
This decision, along with the T.L.O.34 decision, indica 
tes that the Court may be taking a new look at the ap­
plication of the Constitution to public school stu­
dents . 
32 
Bethel v. Fraser. supra note #30. 
33Ibid. 
34New Jersey v. T.L.O.. 105 S. Ct. 733, 83 L. Ed. 
2d 19 (1985). 
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It is possible, for example, that the 
language of the Fraser35 decision might sup­
port greater control of curricular materials 
used in the classroom, retention of books in 
the school library, or the content of stu-
dent-prepared school publications, all issues 
which have been the subject of litigation in 
the past two decades.36 
Right to Religious Freedom 
(Amendment I) 
The decade of the seventies brought an intensive 
pace in church-state legislation and resulting liti­
gious activities. The emotional involvement of some 
state legislatures, religious leaders and lay citizens 
encapsulating the New Right Religious Fundamentalist 
and right-wing political groups, was unprecedented in 
American history. There was often open defiance of 
Supreme Court decisions by some state legislatures pro­
mulgating statues which clearly violated constitutional 
permissiveness. These state legislative acts continued 
to run into the judicial idealogical juggernaut Lemon 
137 tripart test. 
The Burger Court rendered numerous decisions con­
cerning church-state relations. However, the landmark 
35 Bethel v. Fraser, supra note #30. 
36 
A Legal Memorandum, supra note #24, pp. 5-6. 
37 
Lemon v. Kurtzman. 403 U. S. 602, 91 S. Ct. 
2105, 29 L. Ed. 2d 745, (1971). 
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case is the Lemon v. Kurtzman38 case of 1971. Other 
cases, i.e. P.E.A.R.L. and Levitt, even though consid­
ered to be landmark cases in their own right, were de­
cided on the basis of the decision rendered in the 
Lemon 139 case. I have chosen several cases to discuss 
in this area because of their precedent-setting impact 
on the judicial process. While each case is important 
in its own right, attention should be given to the 
Lemon 1*0 case because it established a foundation for 
the development of the succeeding cases. Also, focus 
should be given to Mueller v. Allen;41 because of its 
potential to open the doors for a dual educational sys­
tem in the United States. 
Lemon v. Kurtzman 
403 U. S. 602, 
91 S. Ct. 2105, 
29 L. Ed. 2d 745, 
404 U. S. 876 (1971) 
38Ibid. 
39Ibid. 
40ibid. 
41, Mueller v. Allen. 103 S. Ct. 3062, 77 L. Ed. 2d 
721 (1983). 
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Facts 
Lemon v. Kurtzman42 was combined with a companion 
case DiCenso v. Earlev.43 Legislative acts in Penn­
sylvania and Rhode Island were at issue. This legisla­
tion provided for non-public school teachers to receive 
salary supplements from state coffers. In both states, 
private or parochial schools had to meet specific 
guidelines in order to qualify for the state funds. In 
the state of Pennsylvania, a Federal District Court 
ruled that the Act violated neither the Establishment 
Clause nor the Free Exercise Clause. In the state of 
Rhode Island, a Federal District Court ruled that the 
Act violated the Establishment Clause because of ex­
cessive entanglement between church and state. Both 
decisions were appealed to the United States Supreme 
Court where they were combined for consideration. 
Decision 
42 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra note #37. 
43 
DiCenso v. Earlev. 403 U. S. 602, 91 S. Ct. 
2105, 29 L. Ed. 2d. 745, (1971). 
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The United States Supreme Court judged both legis­
lative acts as unconstitutional by a 7-1 and an 8-1 
vote, respectively. Chief Justice Burger wrote the 
opinion for the Court. He stated in part: 
A law may be one "respecting" the for­
bidden objective while falling short of its 
total realization. A law "respecting" the 
proscribed result, that is, the establishment 
of religion, is not always easily identifi­
able as one violative of the Clause. A given 
law might not establish a state religion but 
nevertheless be one "respecting" that end in 
the sense of being a step that could lead to 
such establishment and hence offend the First 
Amendment.... Every analysis in this area must 
begin with consideration of the cumulative 
criteria developed by the Court over many 
years. Three such tests may be gleaned from 
our cases. First, the statute must have a 
secular legislative purpose; second, its 
principal or primary effect must be one that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion; fin­
ally, the statute must not foster "an exces­
sive government entanglement with reli­
gion. "44 
Chief Justice Burger explains what the Court means 
by the term entanglement in the following passage: 
In order to determine whether the gov­
ernment entanglement with religion is exces­
sive, we must examine the character and pur­
pose of the institutions which are benefited, 
the nature of the aid that the State pro­
vides, and the resulting relationship between 
the government and the religious authority.45 
44 
Lemon v. Kurtzman. supra note #37. 
45Ibid. 
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Discussion 
The Lemon I case establishes the basis for a great 
deal of litigation throughout the decade of the seven­
ties. The tripart test is used repeatedly to deter­
mine the constitutionality of various issues before the 
courts. The almost-unanimous decision in this case 
deteriorated to several 5-4 splits in ensuing cases 
which came before the Court. 
Lemon v. Kurtzman. 
411 U.S. 192 (1973) . 
Facts 
As a result of the decision in the Lemon I case, 
suit was brought before the Court concerning the pay­
ment of services rendered prior to the date when the 
legislative action was declared unconstitutional in 
Lemon I. 
Decision 
On April 2, 1973, the Supreme Court in a 5 - 3 de­
cision (Justice Marshall did not participate.), sus­
tained the concept of payment to religious elementary 
and secondary schools for services rendered prior to 
the date when the legislative enactment was declared 
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unconstitutional.46 
Discussion 
Justice Burger, writing the Court opinion, insist­
ed there was no bad faith on behalf of state officials 
and sectarian schools in payment for expenses incurred 
prior to the Court's decision. 
Committee for Public Education and 
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist. 
93 S. Ct. 2955 (1973) 
Facts 
The Nyquist case developed on appeal from the Fed­
eral District Court, Southern District, New York. The 
central issue was New York legislative activities es­
tablishing three financial grant programs for private 
and religious elementary and secondary schools. The 
three programs were: (1) Section I provides monetary 
grants to "qualifying" (a qualifying school is a 
non-public school serving low income families) private 
and religious non-public schools for "maintenance" and 
for "repair" of school facilities and equipment, there­
by insuring student's health, safety and welfare. The 
46Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973). 
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legislative formula provided $30 per pupil ($40 if the 
school facilities were 25 years old) on an annual bas­
is. (2) Section II developed a tuition reimbursement 
plan, ($50 per pupil for elementary schools and $100 
for secondary schools — no grant to exceed 50* of ac­
tual tuition) for parents whose children attended pri­
vate or religious schools with annual incomes of less 
than $5,000. (3) Sections III, IV, and V provided tax 
relief for parents unable to qualify under Section II. 
Specifically, this section allowed parents to deduct a 
fixed amount from adjusted gross income for each child 
attending non-public schools. 
The New York Legislature maintained that the sta­
tute was: (1) secular, neutral, and non-ideological; 
(2) necessary for providing alternative education sys-
\ 
terns for a pluralistic society; (3) necessary because a 
sharp decline in non-public schools would create an 
educational holocaust caused by swelling enrollments 
and affecting quality of public education. 
Decision 
On June 25, 1975, the Court ruled the statute un­
constitutional in a 6 - 3 decision. Justice Powell 
writing for the Court maintained that "it simply cannot 
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be denied that this action has a primary effect that 
advances religion in that it subsidizes directly the 
religious activities of sectarian elementary and secon­
dary schools." Justice Powell argued that the statute 
was a clear violation of the "Establishment Clause."47 
Discussion 
The state presses two basic arguments: (1) tuition 
reimbursement to parents was constitutionally permiss­
ible; (2) the plan made possible "low income parents" 
exercising their First Amendment rights for religious 
education for their children. Regardless of legisla­
tive human consideration and constitutional explana­
tions, Justice Powell maintained, "The state has taken 
a step which can only be regarded as one 'advancing1 
religion."48 
Levitt v. Committee for Public Education 
and Religious Liberty. 
47 Committee for Public Education and jReliqious 
Liberty v. Nyquist, 93 S. Ct. 2955 (1973). 
48Ibid. 
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93 S.Ct. 2914 (1973). 
The Levitt case developed on appeal from the 
Federal District Court, Southern District, New York 
where a three judge panel ruled as unconstitutional a 
New York statute. The statute appropriated $28 million 
dollars for reimbursement to non-public schools for 
"mandated services," specifically: 
...for expenses of services for examina­
tions and inspection in connection with ad­
ministration, grading and the compiling and 
reporting of the results of tests and examin­
ation, maintenance of pupil health records, 
recording of personnel qualifications and 
characteristics and the preparation and sub­
mission to the state of various other reports 
as provided for or required by law.49 
Decision 
On June 25, 1973, the Court sustained the lower 
court's ruling by deciding that the act was a violation 
of the "Establishment Clause" in an 8 - 1 decision 
(Justice White dissented). Justice Burger wrote the 
majority opinion maintaining: 
49 
Levitt v. Committee for Public Education and 
Religious Liberty. 93 S. Ct. 2819 (1973). 
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. . .we are left with no choice under 
Nyquist but to hold that Chapter 138 consti­
tutes an impermissible aid to religion; this 
is so because the aid that will be devoted to 
secular functions is not identifiable and 
separate from the sectarian activities.50 
Discussion 
Justice Burger rejects appellates1 arguments that 
the statute was within the spirit and limits of Everson 
and Allen, and that "mandated services" should have 
state assistance. Justice Burger implies that: (1) bus 
rides and textbooks were substantially different when 
compared with teacher tests, which were "an integrated 
part of the teaching process,"51 and (2) a state may 
mandate lighting and sanitary facilities with no com­
pulsion for financial assistance. Continuing, Justice 
Burger says "lump sum payments under Chapter 138 vio­
late the establishment clause."52 
Sloan v. Lemon. 
50Ibid. 
51Ibid. 
52Ibid. 
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43 S. Ct. 2982 (1973) 
Facts 
Immediately following the Lemon I decision, the 
Pennsylvania legislature attempted to bypass the Courts 
directive by passing into law the Parent Reimbursement 
Act which granted parents of children attending private 
and parochial schools tuition reimbursements. The case 
came on appeal from the Federal District Court, Eastern 
District where the Pennsylvania statute was declared 
unconstitutional by a three-judge panel. The statute 
provided partial payment ($75 for elementary school 
children and $150 for secondary school children) to 
parents whose children attended non-public schools. 
The statute was funded from the state "cigarette tax" 
and was administered by a five-member "Pennsylvania 
Parent Assistance Authority." 
The statute provided no "administrative" or "acc­
ountable" features in curriculum development, personnel 
and instruction policies for non-public schools. 
Decision 
113 
Justice Powell, writing the majority opinion (6 -
3, Justices Burger, White, and Rehnquist dissenting) 
pointed specifically to the Supreme Court Decision in 
Lemon I. The constitutional issue, said Justice 
Powell, is: 
Whether that benefit be viewed as a sim­
ple tuition subsidy, as an incentive to par­
ents to send their children to sectarian 
school, or as a reward for having done so, at 
bottom, its intended consequence is to pre­
serve and support religious-oriented institu­
tions. 53 
The Pennsylvania statute, Justice Powell maintain­
ed, is "financial support of religion," thereby, uncon­
stitutional . 54 
Discussion 
Pennsylvania's Legislature cloaks the statute in 
general secular splendor such as : (1) non-public 
school children reduce cost of public schools; (2) 
there is a severe hardship on parents of non-public 
school children; and (3) if Pennsylvania's 500,000 
non-public school children were to be "dumped" in the 
53 
Sloan v. Lemon. 43 S. Ct. 2982 (1973) 
54_. . . 
Ibid. 
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public schools, annual operating costs would be ex­
treme. Pennsylvania's Legislature acknowledges that 
parents of non-public school children provide a vital 
educational service to the state and prevent "an other­
wise intolerable public burden."55 
' Parents of secular (non-religion), non-public 
school children asked the Supreme Court to make a dis­
tinction between secular and sectarian schools and to 
declare Pennsylvania's enactment constitutional con­
cerning private secular schools. Justice Powell insis­
ted that there was no distinction - secular and sectar­
ian are distinctions without a difference insofar as 
Pennsylvania's statute is concerned.56 
Meek v. Pittenqer. 
421 U.S. 602 (1975). 
Facts 
56Ibid. 
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The Meek case came on appeal from the Federal 
District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania. At issue was Pennsylvania's legislative 
efforts to aid religious and private schools. In 1972, 
the Pennsylvania Legislature established Acts 194 and 
195. Act 194 was a general "ausiliary service" statute 
providing counseling, testing, psychological services, 
and speech and hearing therapy. Moreover, Act 194 
provided teachers and other related services to excep­
tional children, which included remedial students, and 
educationally-disadvantaged students. Finally, Act 194 
provided for "secular" services currently enjoyed by 
all public school children. 
Act 195 declared that textbooks, instructional 
materials (such as periodicals, photographs, maps, 
charts, sound recordings, films, printed or published 
materials), and instructional equipment (such as pro­
jection equipment, recording equipment, and laboratory 
equipment) be loaned to sectarian and private schools. 
The district court, always consistent in 
church-state decisions, denied relief. 
Decision 
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With Justice Potter Stewart writing for the Court, 
the United States Supreme Court affirmed in part 
("textbook" provision of Act 195) and reversed as "es­
tablishment," Act 194 and remaining parts of Act 195. 
With the exception of the textbook provision, Justice 
Stewart maintained, "it would simply ignore reality to 
attempt to separate secular education functions from 
the predominantly religious role."57 
Discussion 
The 6-3 decisions in both Acts do not include 
the same line-up of Justices. For example, Justices 
Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, Douglas, Brennan, and 
Marshall were in the majority in declaring Acts 194 and 
195 unconstitutional as "establishment of religion." 
Obviously, Justices Burger, Rehnquist and White were in 
the minority on the same issue. However, the "textbook 
provision" found Justices Burger, White, Rehnquist, 
Stewart, Blackmun and Powell in the majority, with 
Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dissenting.58 
Circumstances concerning the Meek decision are 
57Meek v. Pittenqer. 421 U.S. 602 (1975). 
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construed as devastating to political and religious 
leaders who seek legislative enactments that support 
public funds for religious schools. The Court ap­
pears to truncate almost every conceivable possibility 
of "auxiliary services." Yet, that appearance is de­
ceiving, as the historical record indicates. 
Wolman v. Walters 
97 S. Ct. 2593 
433 U.S. 229 (1977) 
Facts 
This case, decided on June 24, 1977, arrived on ap­
peal from the Federal District Court for the Southern 
District of Ohio. At issue was the constitutionality 
of Ohio Rev. Code 3317.06 (Supp. 1976) and all the pro­
visions thereof authorizing financial aid to sectarian 
schools. The statute specifically authorized: (1) the 
purchase of secular textbooks that were used in public 
schools and approved by the school superintendent for 
loan to pupils or parents on request made to the 
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non-public school;59 (2) provisions for speech and 
hearing diagnostic services, diagnostic psychological 
services (personnel being local school board employees) 
and physicians' services with all treatment administer­
ed at the discretion of the sectarian school;60 (3) 
provisions for specialized therapeutic, guidance, and 
remedial services by employees of local school boards 
and/or State Department of Health, administered in pub­
lic schools, public centers, or in secular mobile units 
located off sectarian school premises;61 (4) provisions 
for the purchase and loan to pupils or parents of in­
structional material and equipment (same materials used 
in public schools) that are "incapable of diversion to 
religious use;62 and (5) provisions for transportation 
for field trips identical to public schools.63 
The federal district court approved the constitu­
tionality of textbooks; standardized testing and scor­
ing services; and diagnostic, therapeutic, and remedial 
5Q 
Wolman v. Walter. 97 S. Ct. 2613, 433 U.S. 263 
(1977) 
6QIbid. 
61Ibid. 
62Ibid. 
63Ibid. 
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services. Provisions for instructional materials, 
equipment, and field trips were ruled as unconstitu­
tional . 
Decision 
On June 24, 1977, the United States Supreme Court 
ruled on each of the issues with a separate vote. The 
Court ruled as constitutional (1) textbooks for religi­
ous elementary and secondary schools (5-4), (2) testing 
and scoring as administered in religious elementary and 
secondary schools (5-4), (3) diagnostic services in 
religious elementary and secondary schools (8-1), (4) 
therapeutic services, i.e. psychological, speech, and 
hearing services in religious elementary and secondary 
schools (7-2), and (5) therapeutic services i.e. gui­
dance and counseling services in religious elementary 
and secondary schools.64 
The following provisions were found unconstitu­
tional: (1) instructional materials and equipment for 
religious elementary and secondary schools, and (2) 
field trips for religious elementary and secondary 
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schools.65 
Discussion 
The Wolman decision is a major landmark case. In 
reality, the Ohio statute is complex and the Court's 
Justices line up on many sides of the issues. Wolman's 
decision signals a new direction. Certainly, the clear 
position as outlined in Lemon I, Nyquist, Levitt. Lemon 
III, and Meek, gives way to a new interpretation in 
Wolman by the Court. 
Committee for Public Education and Religious 
Liberty et el. v. Regan 
100 S. Ct. 840 
444 U.S. 644 (1980). 
Facts 
This case was a legislative response to the 
Supreme Court's Levitt66 decision in 1973 which struck 
66 
Levitt v. P.E.A.R.L.. supra #49. 
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down a New York statute appropriating public money to 
private and religious schools for state-mandated test­
ing and reporting services. The new statute sought to 
remove the flawed, unconstitutional provision. Thus, 
the new statute did not provide any general reimburse­
ment for preparation, administration, or grading of 
teacher-prepared tests. The new statute provided only 
for actual cost in providing secular services includ­
ing: school enrollment and attendance data and adminis­
tration of state-prepared examinations. Moreover, the 
statute provided for auditing payments and verifying 
services. 
Decision 
The Seventh Federal District Court in New York 
initially declared the statute unconstitutional, and 
the United States Supreme Court, on appeal, remanded 
the case based on the Wolman decision. On remand, the 
District Court, held the statute constitutional.67 
67 
Committee for Public Education and Religious 
Liberty et el. v. Regan, 100 S. Ct. 849 (1980). 
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Discussion 
The Court, with Justice Byron White writing the 
majority (5-4) opinion, insisted that the statute ar­
rangement did not violate the First Amendment Estab­
lishment Clause. The central issue was whether or not 
lump sum payments, as provided by New York statute, 
could be made to private and religious elementary and 
secondary schools without violating the First Amendment 
advancement clause and excessive government entangle­
ment provision of the Court's tripartite test. The 
answer was that New York may do so. 
Mueller et al. v. Allen et al. 
13 S. Ct. 3062, 
77 L. Ed. 2d 721 (1983). 
Facts 
Mueller v. Allen68 may be the most important reli­
gious school decision since the Court undertook the 
responsibility for deciding religious issues in the 
6 Q 
Mueller v. Allen, supra note #41. 
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public schools in 1925.69 The case originated from a 
Minnesota state statute which allows state taxpayers, 
in computing their state income tax, to deduct expenses 
incurred in providing "tuition, textbooks and transpor­
tation" for their children attending an elementary or 
secondary school. A group of Minnesota taxpayers 
brought suit in Federal District Court against the 
Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue and those parents who 
had taken the tax deduction for expenses incurred while 
sending their children to parochial schools. The peti­
tioners charged that the statute violated the Estab­
lishment Clause of the First Amendment by providing 
financial assistance to religious institutions. The 
District Court ruled for the respondents "holding that 
the statute is neutral on its face and in it applica­
tion and does not have a primary effect of either ad­
vancing or inhibiting religion."70 The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the decision of the District Court. 
Decision 
69 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 45 
S Ct. 571 (1925). 
70 
Mueller v. Allen, supra note #41. 
124 
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the 
decision of the lower courts was affirmed by a vote of 
5-4. Joining in the majority opinion were Chief Jus­
tice Burger and Associate Justices Rehnquist, White, 
Powell, and O'Connor. Associate Justice Marshall filed 
a dissenting opinion in which Brennan, Blackmun, and 
Stevens joined.71 Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority 
opinion for the Court maintaining that a "state's deci­
sion to defray the cost of educational expenses incurr­
ed by parents - regardless of the type of schools their 
children attend - evidences a purpose that is both se­
cular and understandable.72 
Justice Marshall filed a vehement dissenting opin­
ion with which Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens 
joined. Justice Marshall stated in part: 
The Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment prohibits a State from subsidizing 
religious education, whether it does so di­
rectly or indirectly....The majority today 
does not question the continuing vitality of 
this Court's decision in Nyquist. That deci­
sion established that a State may not support 
71Ibid. 
"ibid. 
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religious education either through direct 
grants to parochial schools or through finan­
cial aid to parents of parochial school stu­
dents ....N^guist also established that finan­
cial aid to parents of students attending 
parochial schools is no more permissible if 
it is provided in the form of a tax credit 
than if provided in the form of cash pay­
ments.... The Minnesota tax statute violates 
the Establishment Clause for precisely the 
same reason as the statute struck down in 
Nyquist; it has a direct and immediate effect 
of advancing religion.73 
Discussion 
The Mueller74 decision can open the dcfi^r for other 
states to adopt similar legislative acts. Such legis­
lative acts have the potential to drain, from the pub­
lic schools, students of middle-class parents. Without 
the tax deductions allowed by such acts, many of these 
parents will not be financially able to send their 
children to private or parochial schools. 
This decision caused many to fear that the wall 
between church and state had fallen. However, the fear 
vanished in two 1985 Court decisions: Grand Rapids v. 
Ball75 and Aquilar v. Felton76. These decisions once 
73Ibid. 
74Ibid. 
75Grand Rapids v. Ball. 105 S. Ct. 3216. 
76Aquilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232. 
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again struck down Michigan and New York laws as uncon­
stitutional. These laws are designed to provide sup­
plementary educational services to children attending 
private religious schools.77 Thus, the question of 
governmental aid to private and religious schools is 
still not settled. 
Grand Rapids v.Ball 
105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985) 
Facts 
This case came out of the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. At issue was a Grand Rapids, Michigan school 
board policy. This policy provided shared time and 
community education program classes to religious ele­
mentary and secondary schools in religious school 
buildings. The policy was declared unconstitutional by 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The school board 
policy included provisions: (1) to pay the religious 
77 Deskbook Encyclopedia of American School Law. 
(Data Research, Inc., Rosemont, Minnesota), 1986, pp. 
206 - 207. 
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schools $6.00 per elementary school room per week and 
$10.00 per secondary school room per week, (2) for the 
removal of religious symbols such as crucifixes or ar­
tifacts (Religious symbols or artifacts abounding in 
adjoining corridors, surrounding rooms and connecting 
buildings were not removed), (3) for the posting of 
signs designating a specific room as a public school 
classroom, and (4) for the accommodation of the 
non-public school calendar.78 
Decision 
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, struck down 
the shared-time program as unconstitutional. Justice 
Brennan, writing for the Court, concluded that both the 
Community Education and Shared-Time programs have the 
primary effect of religious advancement in three ways: 
(1) state-paid teachers working in a pervasively reli­
gious environment "may subtly or overtly indoctrin­
ate. . .students in particular religious tenets;"79 (2) 
the symbolic union of church and state—public-funded 
78 
Grand Rapids v. Ball, supra note #75. 
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instruction within a religious school—"threatens to 
convey a message of state support for religion to stu­
dents and to the general public;"80 ana (3) the public­
ly funded programs "in effect subsidize the religious 
functions of a parochial school...."81 
Discussion 
Justice Brennan acknowledges that the majority of 
the teachers in the community education program are 
employed by the religious schools. Even though the 
Grand Rapids School Board employed all teachers in the 
shared-time program, "a significant portion" were pre­
viously employed in the religious schools.82 to fur­
ther complicate the constitutional question, teachers 
were expected to serve their religious schools "zeal­
ously" while employed by the religious schools, but 
to jetison religious activities when the secular class­
es began. Moreover, teachers were expected to perform 
80Itid. 
81Ibid. 
82Ibid. 
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the split sectarian-secular activities with the same 
students and in the same school rooms.83 
Aguilar v. Felton 
105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985) 
Facts 
This case was an appeal from the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals which addressed the issue of federal 
funds that were received under Title I of the 1965 Ele­
mentary and Secondary Education Act. The funds were to 
pay salaries of public employees who taught in religi­
ous elementary and secondary schools. The 1965 Elemen­
tary and Secondary Education Act Title I authorized the 
Secretary of Education to provide financial assistance 
to school districts (including private schools) 
throughout the United States, and to provide assistance 
to low socio-economic children. The Title I program 
83 
Ibid. 
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was intended to supplement existing programs, not to 
create new ones. 
Early in 1966, the New York City School Board ini­
tiated Title I programs. Classes were taught on the 
premises of parochial schools with the majority of the 
children enrolled (82*) in Roman Catholic schools.84 
The Title I programs in religious schools were super­
vised by the School Board's Bureau of Nonpublic 
Schools. All professional personnel were directed to 
avoid religious activities and the use of religious 
materials in their classrooms. Moreover, they were 
encouraged to keep contact with religious school per­
sonnel to a minimum. Also, religious school adminis­
trators "...are required to clear the classrooms used 
by the public school personnel of all religious sym­
bols . "85 
Decision 
Justice Brennan, writing the Court's majority opin­
ion (the Court split 5-4 with Justices Powell, Stevens, 
84Aquilar v. Felton. supra note #76. 
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Marshall, and Blackmun joining Justice Brennan to make 
the majority), insisted that the New York School Board 
policy using Title I federal funds for public school 
teachers to teach in parochial school was unconstitu­
tional as First Amendment establishment.86 Justice 
Brennan insisted the established monitoring activities 
resulted in "...excessive entanglement of church and 
state."87 
Discussion 
The issues in this case are strikingly similar to 
those in the Ball case. The Court has consistently 
held as unconstitutional the expenditure of public tax 
dollars in secular schools. 
Wallace v. Jeffree 
105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985). 
86ibid. 
87Ibid. 
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Facts 
This case came on appeal from Alabama through the 
District Court, Southern District, where it was dis­
missed. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed 
the decision of the District Court in part and remanded 
the case back to the lower court. The Court of Appeals 
also denied a rehearing en banc. The case was then 
appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 
In 1981, the Alabama General Assembly enacted leg­
islation authorizing a one-minute period of silence 
"for meditation or voluntary prayer" in all public 
schools. There were three parts to the Act: (1) Sta­
tute 16-1-20 simply prescribed a child in school had a 
right to meditate in silence. The federal district 
court discovered no constitutional flaws with this sec­
tion. (2) Statute 16-1-20.1 authorizes a period of si­
lence for "meditation or voluntary prayer," and (3) 
Statute 16-1-20.2 authorized teachers to lead willing 
students in the following prayer: 
Almighty God, You alone are God. We a -
cknowledge You as the Creator and Supreme 
Judge of the World. May Your justice, Your 
truth, and Your peace abound this day in the 
hearts of our countrymen, in the counsels of 
our government, in the sanctity of our homes 
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and in the classrooms of our schools in the 
name of our Lord. Amen.88 
Decision 
Justice John Paul Stevens, writing the Court's ma­
jority opinion (the Court split 6-3 with Justices 
Burger, White, and Rehnquist dissenting), insists that 
the Alabama legislative enactment authorizing in public 
schools a moment of silence for "...meditation or vol­
untary prayer was an endorsement of religion..." was 
unconstitutional as religious establishment.89 
Discussion 
The Court has ruled as unconstitutional one of the 
last vestiges of hope set forth by the religious estab­
lishment in America. The Burger Court has struck down 
every attempt to place any form of prayer into the pub­
lic schools of America. The wall that separates church 
and state is certainly intact at the end of the Burger 
era. 
QO 
Wallace v. Jeffree. 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985). 
89Ibid. 
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Right to Freedom from Illegal 
Searches and Seizures 
(Amendment IV) 
Parents of school children have sought to expand 
the constitutional rights of their children to be co­
extensive with those of adults since the In re Gault90 
decision of 1967. The 1969 Tinker91 decision appeared 
to have done just that. However, two recent Supreme 
Court decisions appear to have halted this contention: 
New Jersey v. T.L.0.92 and Bethel School District v. 
Fraser.93 The Court cited the dissenting opinion in 
the Tinker case in stating that the rights of public 
school students are not necessarily coextensive with 
those of adults.94 
The Burger Court had the opportunity to deal with 
the question of search and seizure and the rights asso­
ciated with search and seizure in 1985 in the case cit-
on 
In re Gault. 387 U. S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. 
Ed. 2d 527 (1967). 
91 
Tinker v. Pes Moines, supra note #21. 
92 New Jersey v. T.L.O.. supra note #34. 
93 Bethel v. Fraser. supra note #30. 
94 
Tinker v. Pes Moines, supra note #21. 
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ed as New Jersey v. T.L.O..95 
New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
105 S. Ct. 733, 
83 L. Ed. 2d 19 (1985) 
Facts 
A high school teacher suspected T.L.O., a fourteen 
year old student, of smoking in the school restroom 
with a friend. The teacher reported the two students 
to the assistant principal. T.L.O. denied that she had 
been smoking. Her friend admitted that she had in fact 
been smoking. The assistant principal asked to see 
T.L.O. *s purse and found a pack of cigarettes in it. 
While removing the cigarettes from her purse, the as­
sistant principal noticed a pack of rolling papers. 
Assuming that the rolling papers were used for smoking 
marijuana, he continued to search the purse and found 
marijuana, a pipe, a large amount of money in one-dol-
95 
New Jersey v. T.L.O., supra note #34. 
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lar bills, an index card listing names of people who 
owed her money, and two letters that implicated her in 
drug dealing.96 
The school administration then summoned T.L.O.'s 
parents and the local police. T.L.O. then admitted 
that she was guilty of selling and using marijuana. 
She was successfully prosecuted on a delinquency 
charge. On appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court, the 
conviction was overturned on the basis that the search 
was unreasonable and that the evidence of the search 
should have been barred from the trial under the exclu­
sionary rule. 9"? 
Decision 
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the 
Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of 
unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches 
conducted by school officials. The Court further ruled 
that: 
96Ibid. 
97Ibid. 
137 
The accommodation of privacy interests 
of school children with substantial need of 
teachers and administrators for freedom to 
maintain order in schools does not require 
strict adherence to requirement that searches 
be based on probable cause to believe that 
subject of search has violated or is violat­
ing the law; rather, legality of search of 
student should depend simply on reasonable­
ness, under all the circumstances of the 
search.98 
Justice White rendered the opinion for the Court 
stating in part: 
Against the child's interest in privacy 
must be set the substantial interest of 
teachers and administrators in maintaining 
discipline in the classroom and on school 
grounds. Maintaining order in the classroom 
has never been easy, but in recent years, 
school disorder has often taken particularly 
ugly forms: drug use and violent crime in the 
schools have become major social pro­
blems... Even in schools that have been spar­
ed the most severe disciplinary problems, the 
preservation of order and a proper education­
al environment requires close supervision of 
school children, as well as the enforcement 
of rules against conduct that would be per­
fectly permissible if undertaken by an adult. 
Events calling for discipline are frequent 
occurrences and sometimes require immediate, 
effective action...Accordingly, we have re­
cognized that maintaining security and order 
in the schools requires a certain degree of 
flexibility in school disciplinary proce­
dures, and we have respected the value of 
preserving the informality of the student-
98Ibid. 
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teacher relationship...We hold today that 
school officials need not obtain a warrant 
before searching a student who is under their 
authority.99 
...Such a search will be permissible in 
its scope when the measures adopted are rea­
sonably related to the objectives of the 
search and not excessively intrusive in light 
of the age and sex of the student and the 
nature of the infraction...This standard 
will, we trust, neither unduly burden the 
efforts of school authorities to maintain 
order in their schools nor authorize unre­
strained intrusions upon the privacy of 
school children.100 
Discussion 
The Court, in essence, establishes a two-pronged 
test of reasonableness in student searches. The school 
authority must first be convinced that a search of the 
student will result in the discovery of evidence that 
the student has violated the law or a school rule. 
Second, the search must be prompted by the circum­
stances that led to the search in the first place. In 
the case of T.L.O., the fact that the assistant princi­
pal first found cigarettes and then rolling papers rea­
sonably convinced him to continue the search. This 
"ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
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decision does not give school administrators the au­
thority to conduct random searches of students. 
Right to Receive Information 
and Ideas (Amendment I) 
Extension of constitutional rights to public 
school students has not been an organized professional 
movement but has resulted chiefly from case law. The 
important case of Tinker 10* has been the principal 
legal influence in establishing a student's right to 
receive information and ideas. Two important United 
States Supreme Court decisions which illustrate the 
legal issues involved in this area are: Minarcini v. 
Stronqsville City School District.102 and Board of Edu­
cation. Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 
v. Pico (1982).103 
Minarcini v. Stronqsville City School District 
lOlTinker v. Pes Moines, supra note #21. 
102 Minarcini v. Stronqsville City School 
District, 384 F. Supp. 698, (N.D. Ohio 1974), aff'd in 
part, rev'd in part, 541 F. 2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976). 
103 Board of Education, Island Tree Union Free 
School District No. 26 v. Pico. 457 U. S. 853, 102 S. 
Ct. 2799, 73 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1982). 
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384 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Ohio 1974), aff'd in part, 
rev'd in part, 541 F. 2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976) 
Facts 
The parents of five students in a high school in 
Strongsville, Ohio brought action, on behalf of their 
children, against the Strongsville City School Dis­
trict, the school board, and the superintendent. The 
central issue was that the school board refused to ac­
cept the faculty's recommendation to purchase particu­
lar novels for use in the English curriculum, and, re­
moved particular books from the school library. The 
petitioners claimed constitutional violations by the 
school district. 
The District Court, with Justice Kanpansky writing 
the opinion, found no constitutional violation. On ap­
peal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, with Justice 
Edwards writing the opinion, separated the complaint 
into two issues: (1) the selection and removal of text­
books, and (2) the removal of library books. The 
Circuit Court affirmed the District Court's decision 
upholding the school board's authority to select and 
remove textbooks. However, Justice Edwards maintained 
that neither the state nor school board is required to 
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establish libraries in schools. Once established, a 
library becomes a privilege that cannot be withdrawn 
because of political or social tastes of the school 
board. Justice Edwards further insisted that library 
books can be removed only for constitutionally allow­
able reasons. Finally, Justice Edwards determined that 
the removal of certain library books violated students' 
First Amendment rights to receive information. He 
stated: "...the removal of books from a school library 
is a much more serious burden upon freedom of classroom 
discussion than the action found unconstitutional in 
Tinker."104 
Decision 
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the 
Court refused to review the case and affirmed the deci­
sion of the lower court. The Circuit Court upheld the 
school board's authority to select and remove 
textbooks, while maintaining that library books cannot 
be removed based on political or social tastes of the 
board. 
104Minarcini v. Stronqsville, supra note # 102. 
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Discussion 
A significant factor about this decision is the 
unquestionable extension of First Amendment rights to 
school children. The decision rejected the indoctrina­
tion concept of education in which schools exist in 
loco parentis. Instead, Justice Edwards supports stu­
dents1 rights within the philosophical context that the 
school is a "marketplace of ideas." Justice Edwards 
asserts that the removal of library books violates the 
constitutional right of students to know and receive 
information. Yet, in a contrasting response, Justice 
Edwards contends that school board action does not sig­
nificantly hamper teachers' expression. 
Board of Education. Island Tree Union Free School 
District No. 26 v. Pico 
457 U. S. 853, 
102 S. Ct. 2799 
73 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1982). 
Facts 
143 
School board members attended a conference spon­
sored by the People of New York United - supposedly a 
conservative organization composed of parents concerned 
about the organization and governance of education. A 
part of the conference focused on the control of text­
books and library, books which resulted in a list of 
books considered to be objectionable. The school board 
returned home,, and,, in time, some members began to 
examine the high school library card catalog to deter­
mine which of the objectionable books were in the high 
school library. In early November, 1975, two school 
board members, while attending a "Winter School Night," 
asked the custodian to let them into the school li­
brary. While looking through the card catalog search­
ing for books on the list, they were surprised by the 
school principal. The board members explained their 
reason for being there and then left the library.105 
At the end of the February, 1976 school board 
meeting, the high school principals were asked to re­
main. A lengthy discussion of the books which appeared 
on the list of objectionable books prepared by the Peo­
ple of New York United followed. The high school prin-
105Pico v. Board of Education, supra note #103. 
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cipals and junior high principals were asked to remove 
the objectionable books from the library shelves. The 
superintendent objected, and the school board rejected 
the superintendent's protests. They later agreed to 
appoint a book review committee. Three months later, 
this committee recommended that all the books be re­
turned to the libraries. The school board rejected the 
committee's recommendations with only two exceptions.106 
A class-action suit was filed in the United States 
Federal District Court where Judge George C. Pratt dis­
missed the complaint and ruled in favor of the school 
board. The petitioners appealed to the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor 
of the petitioners. Justice Sifton wrote the opinion 
for the Court of Appeals and stated that the case was a 
violation of the First Amendment because: 
(1) the children's welfare and education 
were never the real issues for book removal; 
(2) the school board's reasons for book re­
moval were "confusion" and "incoherence"; (3) 
school board's informal and dilatory manner 
and method of procedure; (4) the ex post fac­
to appointment of a book review committee and 
then ignoring the committee's recommenda­
tions; (5) strong professional opposition; 
and (6) "substantive irregularities.... of 
106Ibid. 
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reviewing works by such generally recognized 
authors as Swift, the late Richard Wright, 
and Bernard Malamud, whose book, The Fixer. 
was, indeed, an assigned high school reading 
text.107 
Decision 
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the 
decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed by a 5 -
4 vote. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, Blackmun, 
and White joined in the majority opinion. Justice 
Brennan wrote the majority opinion for the Court, stat­
ing in part: 
We hold that local school boards may not 
remove books from school library shelves sim­
ply because they dislike the ideas contained 
in those books and seek by their removal to 
"prescribe what shall be orthodox in poli­
tics, nationalism, religion, or other matters 
of opinion.1,108 
Discussion 
The issue of censorship is not yet resolved. The 
5 -4 vote in this case informs educators that the ju­
diciary has had significant trouble in establishing a 
legal precedent on which school officials may depend. 
Chief Justice Burger, with whom Justices Powell, 
107 ibid. 
108 Ibid. 
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Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined, wrote the dissenting 
opinion in this case. He stated that "the federal 
courts will be the judge of whether the motivation for 
book removal was 'valid' or reasonable."109 chief Jus­
tice Burger insisted that school boards, not federal 
judges, should make decisions concerning library book 
selection.*10 
Summary 
The primary Amendments which affect students' 
rights are the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments 
of the United States Constitution. The First Amendment 
assures the student the right to free speech; the right 
to religious practice; and the right to receive infor­
mation and ideas. The Fourth Amendment assures that 
students will be protected from illegal searches and 
seizures. Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment, protects 
the right to due process. 
These five categories of student's rights are dis­
cussed accordingly: due process, free speech, religious 
freedom, protection from illegal searches and seizures, 
and receiving information and ideas. The individual 
109Ibid. 
110Ibid. 
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cases which relate to the Due Process Clause (Amendment 
XIV) are Goss v. Lopez, Wood v. Strickland. Carey v. 
Piphus, and Inqraham v. Wright. The case which re­
flects the concept of Free Speech (Amendment I) is 
Bethel School District v. Fraser. Cases pertinent to 
the right to religious freedom are: Lemon v. Kurtzman 
(1971), Lemon v. Kurtzman (1973), P.E.A.R.L. v. 
Nyquist. Levitt v. P.E.A.R.L.. Meek v. Pittenger. 
Wolman v. Walter. P.E.A.R.L. v. Regan. Mueller v. 
Allen. Grand Rapids School District v. Ball. Aquilar v. 
Felton, and Wallace v. Jeffree. In the case of New 
Jersey v. T.L.O. . the right to be protected from il­
legal searches and seizures is elucidated according to 
Amendment IV. Finally, the right to receive informa­
tion and ideas (Amendment I) is exemplified with the 
following cases: Minarcini v. strongsville City School 
District, and Board of Education, Island Tree Union 
Free School District No. 26 v. Pico. 
From 1969 until 1986 during the administration of 
the Burger Court, many landmark decisions were made 
which have affected the legal rights of students. An 
analysis of the Burger decisions indicates: (1) that 
the Court stands staunchly behind a students' right to 
due process, (2) that the Court will place limits on a 
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students' right to free speech, (3) that the wall be­
tween church and state is formidable, (4) that the 
Court recognizes the schools' need to conduct student 
searches without the legality of criminal law, (5) that 
the Court recognizes a students' right to receive in­
formation and ideas. In sum, the Burger Court is sen­
sitive to the constitutional rights of students, but 
also sensitive to the need for school administrators to 
maintain control over their schools. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Since 1896, when the United States Supreme Court 
decided the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, the issue of 
the constitutional rights of students has been a con­
tinuing concern of legal scholars, educational adminis­
trators, and the general public. Based on research 
presented in this study, it is apparent that the con­
stitutional rights of students is a continuing concern. 
Constitutional issues are brought to the attention 
of the courts by a variety of individuals and organiza­
tions including: students, parents, teachers, librar­
ians, principals, superintendents, the American Civil 
Liberties Union, and school boards. All con­
stitutional questions may not be settled to the sa­
tisfaction of the complainant, the community, or the 
school board. When the appeals process of the school 
board is exhausted, resolution may require litigation. 
The question of constitutional rights may involve 
issues such as the right to due process, the right to 
free speech, the right to religious freedom, the right 
to be protected from illegal searches and seizures, and 
the right to receive information and ideas. In order 
to make sound educational and legal decisions, school 
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officials should have access to appropriate information 
concerning both the educational and legal issues relat­
ed to these constitutional questions. The comprehen­
sive summaries of potentially litigious educational 
issues provided by this research may assist school of­
ficials in making sound educational decisions concern­
ing a constitutional question. 
Summary 
The introductory material in Chapter One 
identifies the historical fact that the question of the 
constitutional rights of students began in 1898. 
However, public schools are involved in more litigation 
concerning the constitutional rights of students since 
1967 than ever before in the history of American public 
education. Parents' dissatisfaction with the way 
schools handle disciplinary matters concerning their 
children is central to the question of a students' 
constitutional rights. Students' constitutional 
rights have not emerged from well-organized groups, but 
from individual cases involving only a few students at 
a time. 
As a guide to the educational and legal research, 
several questions are formulated and listed in Chapter 
One of this study. While the review of the literature 
provides answers to some of these questions, most of 
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the answers are contained in Chapters Three and Four. 
The responses to these questions comprise the major por­
tion of legal guidelines that school administrators and 
other educational decision makers can refer to when 
making decisions related to the constitutional rights 
of public school students. 
The first question in Chapter One is: What major 
educational issues concerning the violation of consti­
tutional rights of public school students have been 
adjudicated during the Burger years, 1969-1986? The 
major educational issues are: 
A. the conflict between the claim by educators 
that schools operate in loco parentis and the 
claim by students and parents that students are 
entitled to due process. 
B. the conflict between students and school ad­
ministrators concerning the right to free speech. 
C. the conflict between the separation of church 
and state. 
D. the conflict between students and school ad­
ministrators concerning the students' right to 
privacy as opposed to the schools' right to main­
tain order. 
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E. the conflict between the "indoctrination" 
theory of education, fostering the transmission of 
traditional values and community mores, as opposed 
to the contemporary educational view of the school 
as a marketplace of ideas. 
The second question in Chapter One is: Which of 
these issues are likely to result in further litigation 
in the courts? The Burger Court appears to have con­
clusively established that students are entitled to the 
right to minimum due process in every disciplinary ac­
tion which results in suspension or expulsion. Addi­
tionally, the Burger Court closed the doors on the 
question of free speech and the question of search and 
seizure when it ruled in two cases that the constitu­
tional rights of students are not necessarily coexten­
sive with those of adults. However, the conflict be­
tween church and state and the question of the school 
as a marketplace of ideas are still open to further 
litigation. Several of the Burger Court decisions in 
these two areas were 5-4 decisions. As a result, fu­
ture courts will have an opportunity to rule on these 
issues. 
The third question in Chapter One is: What are the. 
acceptable criteria for maintaining order in the public 
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schools, based on the established legal precedents? A 
review of landmark Supreme Court decisions rendered 
between 1969 and 1986 provides school administrators 
with specific guidelines for maintaining order in their 
schools. Schools may apply sanctions against a student 
in almost any disciplinary case if the student has been 
given the right of due process. School boards and 
school administrators do not have immunity from liabil­
ity, other than "good faith immunity," if they violate 
the constitutional rights of students. School adminis­
trators do not have to tolerate offensive language from 
students. Also, school administrators are not held to 
the same standard as a police officer when conducting a 
search of a student. A school official must only be 
able to confirm reasonable suspicion to justify a 
search of a student. 
The fourth question in Chapter One is: Can any 
specific trends be determined from the analysis of the 
court cases rendered by the Burger Court from 1969-
1986? An analysis of selected Supreme Court decisions 
rendered by the Burger Court indicates that no signifi­
cant shift of premises is easily perceptible even 
though the rights of students are ruled not to be co­
extensive with those of adults. Many of the Burger 
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Court's decisions are 5-4 decisions and are open still 
to further interpretation. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Based on an analysis of the cases which came 
before the Burger Court for interpretation, the 
following general conclusions can be made concerning 
the constitutional rights of students: 
(1) Generally, the Court favored the authority of 
school administrators to maintain control over the pub­
lic schools in the United States. 
(2) The Court often expresses reluctance to become 
entangled in the daily school operation in which school 
boards, and school administrators are vested with au­
thority. 
(3) The Court will become involved if a student is 
denied his constitutional right to due process. 
(4) In the area of students' rights, the Tinker case 
remains the staunch precedent on which many major edu­
cational issues are resolved. 
(5) The Burger Court is committed to the concept of 
"separation of church and state." 
(6) The tripart test developed by the Court in 1971 
remains the Court's primary judicial First Amendment 
religious establishment standard. 
(7) The 1983 Mueller decision results in the emer­
gence of a conflicting judicial philosophy from the 
Burger Court. This decision, in effect, reverses more 
than a decade of decisions concerning tax credits, par­
ental reimbursements, and parental tax deductions. 
(8) The Burger Court makes it clear that public school 
students are not entitled to the same constitutional 
considerations as adults in the matter of search and 
seizure. In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Burger Court 
maintains that a less exacting "reasonable suspicion" 
standard is more applicable in the school setting. 
(9) The Burger Court set the standard for removing 
books from school libraries in the 1982 Pico case. In 
this case, the Court noted that the First Amendment 
limits a board's discretion to remove books from school 
libraries. 
(10) The Burger Court leaves the American judicial 
scene with two conflicting judicial philosophies. One 
is a philosophy which gives school administrators great 
leeway in administering the nation's public schools; 
the other is a philosophy that recognizes the basic 
right of students to the protection of the United 
States Constitution. 
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Practical Legal Guidelines 
If a school board or individual school 
administrator becomes involved in a constitutional 
controversy, a conscientious attempt should be made to 
resolve the problem through school board policy and 
action. If such procedure is unsuccessful, a high 
probability exists that litigation will be initiated 
either by an individual student, a group of students, 
teachers, parents, or concerned citizens. Courts will 
not usually accept cases unless local appeal procedures 
are exhausted. 
If a complainant can establish that the school 
board and/or administrators arbitrarily deprived him of 
a constitutional right, he may be able to receive fin­
ancial remuneration under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 
(G.S. 1983). 
No school board policy or guidelines will guaran­
tee in perpetuity the absence of litigation by indivi­
duals or groups who maintain that their rights have 
been violated. However, school boards and school ad­
ministrators can reduce the probability of having 
school practices litigated by formulating, implement­
ing, and explicitly following a set of guidelines gov­
erning the administration of their individual schools 
based on established legal precedent. It is, however, 
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the recommendation of this writer that every school 
administrator and school board member obtain a suffici­
ent amount of liability insurance coverage in order to 
function in an atmosphere that is free of the fear of 
litigation. 
Every school should have available to its stu­
dents and the parents of its students a comprehensive 
student handbook outlining possible sanctions for speci­
fic disciplinary offenses. Students should always be 
given an opportunity to state their side of the story 
prior to exclusion from school for any reason. These 
two procedures will guarantee substantial and procedur­
al due process to the student. School administrators 
and teachers should not be afraid to maintain control 
of their classrooms and schools, but they should take 
steps to insure students of their constitutional 
rights. 
In addition, every school district should also 
adopt a set of written guidelines to govern the admin­
istration of their curriculum and media materials. The 
school board should be prepared to handle complaints 
from citizens groups by adopting a set of guidelines 
concerning selection and withdrawal of school library 
and instructional materials based on established legal 
precedent. 
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School districts should adopt written policies 
concerning student searches. School administrators 
should be aware that random searches and strip searches 
violate the constitutional rights of students and 
often lead to litigation and financial liability. In­
dividual searches of students and their possessions are 
allowable if the search is based on reasonable suspi­
cion as outlined by the Court. 
Students are guaranteed the right to free speech 
so long as the exercise thereof does not substantially 
and materially disrupt the school. Students should not 
have disciplinary sanctions levied against them for 
expressing an unpopular political opinion. However, 
the right to free speech does not allow students to 
offend of fellow students and teachers with obscene 
language under the guise of free speech. 
In recent years, school boards, under pressure 
from outside groups, have adopted a variety of policies 
which have been interpreted by the Court to advance 
religion and entangle church and state. School boards 
should educate themselves in the law which governs such 
policies. Board members should be made aware that 
such policies have been consistently struck down as 
unconstitutional. 
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Recommendations for Further Study 
Numerous issues came before the Burger Court be­
sides those discussed in this dissertation. Future 
study should include an analysis of the constitutional 
rights of handicapped students. The Education For All 
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 and the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973 could serve as the basis of such a study. 
Issues that could be addressed include: state and local 
responsibilities under the EAHCA, mainstreaming, relat­
ed services, financial liability, payment of expenses, 
length of school year, and identification and evalua­
tion of the handicapped. 
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